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How the Charter Has Failed Non‐Citizens in Canada – Reviewing Thirty Years of Supreme Court of
Canada Jurisprudence1

After thirty years of decision making under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, it is now clear
that the Charter has been a disappointment for non‐citizens in Canada. What is worse, during the
Charter‐era Canada has fallen behind many other Western democracies in providing access for non‐
citizens to international human rights protections. This conclusion is not a surprise to anyone who has
been working in the migrant advocacy trenches over the past quarter century, but it is a jarring contrast
to the reputation that Canada has sought for itself as an immigrant welcoming international human
rights leader and it flies in the face of scholarship asserting that human rights have eclipsed citizenship
rights.
On the face of it, Canada ought to be as good as it gets for non‐citizens’ human rights
protections. Canada is a party to most of the major international human rights conventions,2 and is
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There are nine core international human rights instruments listed by the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/index.htm#core. Of these, Canada is a state
party to seven, including : the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966,
United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 993, p. 3 (Canada’s accession 19 May 1976); UN General Assembly,
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, p.
171 (Canada’s accession 19 May 1976); UN General Assembly, International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, 21 December 1965, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 660, p. 195 (Canada’s
ratification 14 October 1970); UN General Assembly, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 1984, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1465, p. 85 (Canada’s
acceptance 8 February 1995)[hereinafter Torture Convention]; UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of
the Child, 20 November 1989, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1577, p. 3 (Canada’s acceptance 17 September
1997); UN General Assembly, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 18
December 1979, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1249, p. 13 (Canada’s ratified 10 December 1981); UN General
Assembly, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly, 24
January 2007, A/RES/61/106 (Canada’s ratification 11 March 2010); Canada also voted in favour of ratifying the :
UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III) UN General
Assembly, which is not considered one of the core instruments because of its declaratory status.
Of the nine core instruments, the two which Canada does not participate in are the UN General Assembly,
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, 18
December 1990, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 2220, p. 3; and the International Convention for the Protection
of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance resolution, adopted by the General Assembly, 20 December 2006,
A/RES/61/177. The first of these is of particular importance for non‐citizens, but has yet to be ratified by any
predominantly migrant receiving state in the global North.
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among a handful of states that have committed themselves to a series of optional protocols allowing
individuals to bring complaints against it.3 Canada has a long‐standing program for permanent
immigration, and immigration is embedded in its national mythology. It is one of the few Western
states where survey data continue to show that the population is supportive of immigrants.4 Indeed,
Canada has recently celebrated the twenty‐fifth anniversary of the award to ‘the Canadian people’ of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee’s Nansen Medal for service to refugees.5 In addition
to all of this, Canada has a strong and contemporary constitutional statement of rights. For all of these
reasons, the failure of the Charter to deliver on its promise of human rights protections for non‐citizens
is counterintuitive.
This paper presents a study of all of the Supreme Court of Canada’s Charter‐era jurisprudence
addressing the rights of non‐citizens. It traces the jurisprudential evolution from early decisions
strongly supportive of non‐citizens’ rights claims, to more recent rulings where non‐citizens’ rights
claims are rejected, sidelined or even ignored. Patterns in decision making are discernible and the
decline in protections for non‐citizens follows logically enough from a series of interpretive stances
made relatively early on. There is evidence here of what I have termed ‘Charter hubris’. This is a leading
factor in explaining the current state of affairs, which works alongside other explanations such as the
traditionally broad ambit of discretion in immigration matters and the securitization of all immigration
matters in the early twenty‐first century. The Supreme Court of Canada is not, of course, the entire
story for non‐citizens rights in Canada. Very few cases ever make it to this pinnacle venue, and
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The optional protocols that Canada has ratified (and total parties to each protocol as of 10 December 2011)
include: Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 10 May 1976, U.N.T.S. vol.
999, p. 171 (114 parties); Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women, 18 October 2002, U.N.T.S. vol. 2131, p. 83 (103 parties); Optional Protocol to the Convention on
the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, 7 July 2000, U.N.T.S. vol. 2173, p. 222 (143
parties); Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution
and Child Pornography, 14 September 2005, U.N.T.S. vol. 2171 p. 227 (151 parties); Second Optional Protocol to
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty, 25 November
2005, U.N.T.S. vol. 1642, p. 414 (73 parties).
4
The population survey conducted by Transatlantic Trends, Immigration 2010,
http://trends.gmfus.org/immigration/doc/TTI2010_English_Key.pdf, showed that Canada was still more supportive
of immigration across a range of indicators than all other countries in North America and Europe. The study also
shows that the Canadian population is less supportive of immigration than in earlier years. See also Nicholas
Keung, ‘Immigrants fitting in well (mostly), Canadians say; But survey shows split over how successfully Muslims
integrating into society’ The Toronto Star, 4 February 2011, A16.
5
The Nansen Medal, now called the Nansen Refugee Award, is named after the first League of Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, and is awarded annually by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The
Canadian people received the award in 1986 in recognition of their support for refugees fleeing the Indo‐Chinese
crisis.
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disproportionately fewer involving non‐citizens. But focusing on the Supreme Court is always justified
because of its leadership role. To complement this analysis, I have also completed a companion study of
international human rights norms in the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada which makes
approximately 50,000 decisions annually concerning non‐citizens.6
The paper begins by outlining the early promise of the Singh and Andrews decisions, setting
them in the context of scholarship on globalization, citizenship rights and human rights. I then turn to a
brief explanation of the methodology for the rest of the study. The next section presents the Supreme
Court of Canada’s Charter‐era non‐citizen jurisprudence in three thematic groups: cases treated by the
Court as rights cases, cases treated as non‐rights cases, and refugee rulings. The analysis is rounded out
by a brief look at the issue of extradition, some highlights of the unsuccessful applications for leave to
appeal, and two cases that do not technically address non‐citizens but that have had important
implications for non‐citizen advocacy. This presentation lays the ground work for the concluding section
which offers explanations for the trajectory of the jurisprudence and contrasts this trajectory with
leading decisions elsewhere.
The argument that the Charter has failed to deliver on its early promise for non‐citizens is made
out at several levels. Most directly, non‐citizens’ Charter claims have rarely been successful. Second,
the Supreme Court of Canada has relied exclusively on the Charter even in cases where applicable
international human rights may have provided stronger protections for non‐citizens. Third, a number of
cases that were argued in human rights terms have not been treated as rights claims by the Court.
Finally, very few non‐citizens rights claims have reach the Supreme Court of Canada. In sum, during the
Charter era non‐citizens have had little success in making Charter rights claims, and even less success in
accessing alternative sources of rights protections, the most important and logical of which is
international human rights law. This result is especially disappointing as some important advancements
in international human rights for non‐citizens have been made elsewhere during this thirty year time
frame.
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Catherine Dauvergne, ‘International Human Rights in Canadian Immigration Law – The Case of the Immigration
and Refugee Board of Canada’ (2012) 19. 1 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 305. The IRB’s total number of
decisions annually has ranged from 34,673 to 62,301 over the nine years surveyed in the article, 2002 to 2010.
The annual average during this period was 48,752.
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In the Beginning ‐ Singh and Andrews
The Charter era opened with two rulings that made vitally important statements for the rights of non‐
citizens. The Charter of Rights and Freedoms came into force on April 17, 1982. The section 15 equality
provisions were delayed to give governments time to bring their legislation into compliance and took
effect three years later on April 17, 1985. In the case of both the generally applicable rights, and the
equality provisions in particular, the first decision to fully grapple with non‐citizens’ rights claims marked
an important victory.
The first of these rulings came in Singh v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration)7
which challenged the existing refugee status determination procedure on the grounds that it did not
provide refugee claimants an oral hearing by a decision maker at any point during the multi‐layered
process. The Court ruledd that this was a breach of principles of fundamental justice, and the
government responded with a complete overhaul of the refugee determination process, and the
introduction of a tribunal process for first instance refugee determination that was, for two decades,
widely regarded as the one of fairest refugee determination processes in the world.8 From a Charter
point of view, the key holding was that the section 7 protections apply to ‘…every human being who is
physically present in Canada…’.9 The Court explicitly rejected a distinction that would have hinged
Charter protection to citizenship, and similarly rejected a distinction based on United States’ law
between those present in the country and those seeking entry.10
Singh has become part of the mythic foundation of Canadian refugee law. The anniversary of its
handing down is celebrated annually as Refugee Rights Day in Canada by the advocacy community.11
And for those who feel refugees have too much legal protection in Canadian law, the Singh ruling is the
emblem of all that is wrong with the law.12 In situating Singh as the starting point of the Court’s Charter
era engagement with non‐citizens, I must scrutinize the ruling in a way that is discomfiting for
mythology, but that I hope will affirm the strength of the ruling nonetheless.
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Singh v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1985] 1 SCR 177.
The system will be transformed when Bill C‐31 of 2012 comes into effect as first instance decisions will no longer
be made by quasi independent decision makers. This change is anticipated to take effect in December 2012.
9
Singh, supra note 7 at para. 81, per Wilson J.
10
Ibid., at para 99.
11
See online: Canadian Council of Refugees, <http://ccrweb.ca/documents/RRDAYpamphletEN.pdf>
12
See for example, Jeffrey Simpson, "…The Supreme Court’s Singh decision, which requires an oral hearing upon
entry into Canada for claimants, the system is too layered, time‐consuming and legalistic." Jeffrey Simpson,
"Solutions Exist to Overhaul the Cumbersome Refugee Process" (7 January 1998) Globe and Mail, A14.
8
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The most important observation about Singh that is lost in its mythology is that only three of the
six members of the panel used the Charter in coming to their conclusions.13 Justice Beetz, with whom
Justices Estey and McIntyre concurred, decided Singh on the basis of the Canadian Bill of Rights. This
undoubtedly came as a great surprise to many given that by 1985 the Bill of Rights was widely regarded
as almost entirely ineffectual.14 Counsel had not argued the case on the basis of the Bill of Rights, but
seven months after the initial hearing the Court contacted the parties and requested written
submissions regarding how the Bill of Rights would apply to the matter at hand. Justice Beetz
‘…refrain[ed] from expressing any views on the question of whether the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms is applicable at all…’.15 But aside from this, he offered little to explain this puzzling choice. He
limited himself to stating that other rights instruments ought not to fall into disuse, especially when
‘…almost tailor‐made for certain factual situations such as those in the cases at Bar.’16 In response,
Justice Wilson (writing on behalf of Chief Justice Dickson and Justice Lamer) stated simply that, ‘…since I
believe the present situation falls within the constitutional protection afforded by the Charter of Rights
and Freedoms, I prefer to base my decision upon the Charter.’17 Justice Beetz’s stance did not lead to a
resurgence of Bill of Rights decision making by the Supreme Court of Canada, nor did it lead to a
different result. It faded into the background as Singh became a cornerstone of Charter mythology,
undoubtedly aided by the leading roles played by Justices Wilson, Dickson and Lamer in the early years
of Charter jurisprudence. However, in looking back at Singh in light of the subsequent trajectory of
decision making regarding non‐citizens, it is useful to remember that only three members of the Court
ever signed on to the strong position taken.
13

Justice Ritchie heard the appeal but retired from the Court before the decision was handed down, and before
the request for arguments addressing the Bill of Rights was made.
14
See for example, Tarnopolsky, W.S. "Discrimination and the law in Canada," (1992) University of New Brunswick
Law Journal 215; Hovius, Berend, "The legacy of the Supreme Court of Canada's approach to the Canadian Bill of
Rights: prospects for the Charter" (1982) 28.1 McGill Law Journal 31.
15
Singh, supra note 7 at 223, per Beetz J.
16
Ibid., at 224. In full Beetz J. wrote:
Section 26 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms should be kept in mind. It provides:
26. The guarantee in this Charter of certain rights and freedoms shall not be construed as denying the
existence of any other rights or freedoms that exist in Canada.
Thus, the Canadian Bill of Rights retains all its force and effect, together with the various provincial
charters of rights. Because these constitutional or quasiconstitutional instruments are drafted
differently, they are susceptible of producing cumulative effects for the better protection of rights and
freedoms. But this beneficial result will be lost if these instruments fall into neglect. It is particularly so
where they contain provisions not to be found in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and
almost tailormade for certain factual situations such as those in the cases at bar.
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It is Justice Wilson’s judgment which has stood the test of time and crystallized into ‘what Singh
stands for’. In addition to the vital holding that the Charter applies to every person physically in
Canada, she also concluded that the rights and interests at stake in refugee determination were
sufficiently serious that deprivation of those rights ‘…must amount to deprivation of security of the
person within the meaning of s. 7.’18 She further stated that as a principle of fundamental justice,
serious issues of credibility must be determined on the basis of an oral hearing.19 It is this requirement
for an oral hearing, with which Justice Beetz agreed (but without comment on the question of ‘security
of the person’), that meant the existing procedure failed scrutiny.20 Justice Wilson also sharply
dismissed the government’s section 1 argument that oral hearings would be too resource intensive to
be practicable.21
Importantly in terms of how non‐citizens in Canada access international human rights norms,
Justice Wilson drew on international standards in two ways. While there was no issue of interpretation
of the Refugee Convention at stake, she did turn to the Convention and cited its Preamble, in assessing
the importance of the rights at stake.22 In developing this reasoning, she relied explicitly on the
Immigration Act objective of fulfilling Canada’s international legal obligations.23 Even more importantly,
in developing her understanding of the substance of ‘security of the person’ she turned to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights Article 25 statement regarding the necessaries of life.24 This interpretive
move is important because it draws a direct linkage between international human rights and the
Charter, and in a different way, because it establishes a very expansive paradigm for security of the
person. Justice Wilson did acknowledge that this breadth of interpretation was not necessary on the

17

Ibid., at 185, per Wilson J.
Ibid., at 207.
19
Ibid., at 213.
20
Ibid., at 229.
18

21

Ibid., at 218. Section 1 of the Charter states, ‘The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the
rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society.
22

Ibid., at 193; Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, U.N.T.S., vol. 189, at 137 ("Refugee
Convention")
23
Ibid., at 192; Immigration Act, 1976, S.C. 1976‐77, c. 52, s. 3(g).
24
Ibid., at 207. UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III).
Article 25, paragraph 1 of the Universal Declaration states:
1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well‐being of himself and of
his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to
security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in
circumstances beyond his control.
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facts in Singh, but she introduced the broad parameters nonetheless.25 In sum, the Singh decision
brought non‐citizens, regardless of immigration status, within the protection of the Charter and linked
that protection in the broadest possible way to international human rights law, even the unenforceable
Universal Declaration.
The second Charter decision that addressed the rights of non‐citizens went even further.
Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia,26 was the Supreme Court of Canada’s first ruling on the
section 15 equality rights and its lore is even greater than that of Singh because of the broad
applicability of equality rights.27 The core of this ruling was to mark out the Court’s ‘substantive’
approach to equality, and to clearly establish that grounds of discrimination ‘analogous’ to those
enumerated in section 15 could receive Charter protection.28 The very first analogous ground of
protection to be recognized was that of non‐citizenship. Mr. Andrews was a permanent resident of
Canada, and British citizen, who had been barred from practicing law in British Columbia because he was
not a Canadian citizen. While the dissentients found this limitation to be a reasonable one, and thus
would have seen it saved by section 1 of the Charter, all members of the panel agreed that equality
protections must protect non‐citizens.29
Unlike the Singh ruling, there is no reference in the Andrews reasons to international human
right standards. The Court does look beyond Canadian borders to engage seriously with the American
constitutional equality jurisprudence, but does not adopt an American approach in full. Importantly for
this analysis of non‐citizens’ rights, the ruling comments directly on the vulnerability of non‐citizens. In
Justice Wilson’s words:
Relative to citizens, non‐citizens are a group lacking in political power and as such vulnerable to
having their interests overlooked and their rights to equal concern and respect violated. They
are among "those groups in society to whose needs and wishes elected officials have no
25

This ruling per‐dates Chief Justice Dickson’s statement in Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act
[1987] 1 SCR 313 regarding the linkage between international human rights and the Charter; see infra at p. 54.
26
Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 SCR 143.
27
See for example, Bayefsky, Anne F. "A case comment on the first three equality rights cases under the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Andrews, Workers' Compensation Reference, Turpin" (1990) Supreme Court Law
Review 503; Eaton, Mary, "Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia." (1990) Canadian Journal of Women and
the Law 276’; Smith, C. Lynn,"Adding a third dimension: the Canadian approach to constitutional equality
guarantees" (1992) 55.1 Law and Contemporary Problems 211.
28
The enumerated grounds are: race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical
disability.
29
The panel included Dickson C.J.C., McIntyre, Lamer, Wilson, LaForest and L’Heureux‐Dubé JJ. Justice Le Dain
heard the case but retired from the Court before the decision was handed down. The dissentients were McIntyre
and Lamer JJ.
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apparent interest in attending": see J. H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust (1980), at p. 151. Non‐
citizens, to take only the most obvious example, do not have the right to vote. Their
vulnerability to becoming a disadvantaged group in our society is captured by John Stuart Mill's
observation in Book III of Considerations on Representative Government that "in the absence of
its natural defenders, the interests of the excluded is always in danger of being overlooked . . .
." I would conclude therefore that non‐citizens fall into an analogous category to those
specifically enumerated in s. 15. I emphasize, moreover, that this is a determination which is
not to be made only in the context of the law which is subject to challenge but rather in the
context of the place of the group in the entire social, political and legal fabric of our society.
While legislatures must inevitably draw distinctions among the governed, such distinctions
should not bring about or reinforce the disadvantage of certain groups and individuals by
denying them the rights freely accorded to others.30
Justice La Forest acknowledged the history in Canada of discrimination in employment on the basis of
nationality, and noted the close linkage between discrimination on the basis of citizenship and
discrimination on the named Charter grounds of national or ethnic origin.31 He concluded in a common‐
sensical tone, ‘If we allow people to come to live in Canada, I cannot see why they should be treated
differently from anyone else.’32
There is nothing in the Andrews ruling to foreshadow anything other than a very promising
rights environment for non‐citizens in the Charter era. The absence of international norms as reference
points here is not surprising given that international human rights law does in fact support a distinction
on the basis of citizenship in the case of public sector employment, which might have been arguable on
these facts.33 At the very most we can remark that Andrews is not an immigration case; it has nothing at
all to do with crossing borders and so it is distinct from many of the types of claims where citizenship
becomes relevant. Indeed the Court goes to some length to focus on the vulnerability and democratic
exclusion of non‐citizens, despite being presented with a claimant who had many markers of privilege.
The fact that the very first equality challenge of the Charter‐era involved the rights of a non‐
citizen, and especially a well‐educated permanent resident with citizenship rights in another prosperous
Western democracy, fits squarely within the trend identified by a number of scholars of human rights
eclipsing citizenship rights as an aspect of contemporary globalization. 34 Saskia Sassen has argued that

30

Andrews, supra note 26 at 152
Ibid., at 195.
32
Ibid., at 201.
33
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 2, provides a right for citizens to have equal
access to public service employment; see infra at p. 23‐25.
34
Chiarelli, whose ase is discussed below at xx‐xx [insert after paginated] was also an EU citizen, but this citizenship
did not include full labour mobility rights until after the 1992 Maastricht Treaty came into effect in 1993; Treaty on
31
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rise of human rights protections now means that the most meaningful distinction in rights protections is
not between citizens and non‐citizens, but between those with a secure immigration status and those
without status.35 Her analysis fits closely with Justice LaForest’s conclusion that he could not see a basis
for treating permanent residents differently, ‘from anyone else’. David Jacobson explored this argument
in detail in Rights Across Borders: Immigration and the Decline of Citizenship36 and added empirical heft
to this analysis with his study of judicial decision making.37 In very broad terms, both Sassen and
Jacobson can be cast as viewing this development positively. Assessing the same phenomenon, the
success of non‐citizens in making rights claims in national courts, Christian Joppke and Gary Freeman
each concluded that the strength of human rights claims has risen to the extent that national
immigration policy making (although in both cases, the authors are talking primarily about the United
States) is constrained by the tendency of courts to extend rights protections to immigrants.38 With
varying emphases, Joppke and Freeman both evaluate this turn negatively. Possibly following the
Andrews decision, the Law Society of British Columbia would have agreed.
From the perspective of non‐citizens’ rights protections, the rulings in Singh and Andrews fit
squarely within the trend of reducing the role of citizenship as an important rights marker. Justice
Wilson in Andrews went so far as to state that citizenship ‘…may not even be rationally connected…’ to
the objective of ensuring lawyers are familiar with Canadian institutions.39 And the Singh ruling
extended the Charter to persons ‘physically present’ in a way that eclipses even Sassen’s analysis of the
importance of legal immigration status. But the trajectory since that time suggests that we are now a
long way from this high‐water mark. It is no coincidence that this scholarly trend peaked in the 1990s,
shortly after the Singh and Andrews rulings. Since that time, citizenship has experienced a resurgence,

European Union (Consolidated Version), Treaty of Maastricht , 7 February 1992, Official Journal of the European
Communities C 325/5.
35
Saskia Sassen, Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization (New York: Columbia University, 1996).
36
David Jacobson, Rights Across Borders: Immigration and the Decline of Citizenship (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1996)
37
David Jacobson and Galya Benarieh Ruffer, ‘Courts Across Borders: The Implications of Judical Agency for Human
Rights and Democracy’ (2003) 25 Human Rights Quarterly 74.
38
Christian Joppke, Citizenship and Immigration (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010); Gary Freeman, "The Decline of
Sovereignty" in C. Joppke, ed., Challenge to the Nation‐State: Immigration in Western Europe and the United States
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
39
Andrews, supra note 26 at para 60.
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including steps by a number of Western governments to ensure that the ‘rational connection’ Justice
Wilson was skeptical about will be strengthened.40
The primary objective of this paper is to examine and explain the experience of non‐citizens
before the Supreme Court of Canada in the time since these seminal rulings. In part, the Canadian
experience fits into a worldwide trend driven forward by globalizing forces and the politics of
securitization, but in some key areas, access to international human rights norms has markedly been
worse for non‐citizens in Canada than elsewhere. The explanation for this is subtly rooted in the Charter
jurisprudence itself, a point I explore after presenting an overview of the cases. Ultimately what matters
is that individuals’ rights claims are appropriately vindicated. The legal vehicle for achieving this goal is
not important. In Canada however, the key rights sources of the Constitution and international law are
intertwined because of the Supreme Court’s early Charter jurisprudence.41 Non‐citizens asserting rights
claims are therefore required to make those arguments first and foremost in Charter terms, and only
secondarily in international human rights terms. This puts non‐citizens in Canada in a different position
than those in England, Australia, New Zealand and even in some circumstances the United States. This
different position has become a worse position over time. The requirement that international rights
claims must be heard through the vehicle of the Charter has reached the point where the term ‘Charter
hubris’ is apt. It can be observed in the relationship between Charter rights and international human
rights in the non‐citizens cases presented here.

Methodology – Which Cases Matter and Why
The data set for this study is all Supreme Court of Canada decisions since the Charter came into effect
that adjudicate rights claims made by non‐citizens. I have selected decisions which deal with the claims
of individuals42 made in situations where non‐citizenship is somehow relevant to the legal issues at
stake. I have focused on non‐citizenship because I am interested in the group of people who are not
Canadian, rather than in distinctions that are made between non‐Canadians (for example, in refugee
40

See for example, Catherine Dauvergne, “Citizenship with a Vengeance” (2007) 8:2 Theoretical Inquiries in Law
489; Kim Rubenstein,"The lottery of citizenship: the changing significance of birthplace, territory and residence to
the Australian membership prize" (2004) 22.2 Law in Context 45; and the collection " Citizenship in a Globalized
World: Perspectives from the Immigrant Democracies” a special issue of Migration Studies edited by
Ayelet Shachar & Geoffrey Brahm Levey, forthcoming 2013.
41
See discussion infra at XX‐XX [insert when paginated].
42
I have not included corporations in the data set.
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claims where one’s state of nationality is of primary importance). The focus on non‐citizenship as
legally relevant means that the majority of the decisions deal with issues originating in the former
Immigration Act or the current Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.43 There will certainly be any
number of cases where the rights of a non‐citizen are at stake, but in which citizenship is irrelevant to
the legal issue at hand. For example, I have not included cases where someone without Canadian
citizenship is involved in a criminal matter or a family law matter, and the issue of citizenship was not
relevant to the case.44 I have taken a broad approach to the question of what counts as a ‘rights claim’,
and therefore have included any claim which could be cast in rights terms, whether or not it was treated
either as a Charter case or as a rights case more generally by the Court. As rights are the basic building
blocks of contemporary legal language, this criterion did not lead to any cases being eliminated from the
set that would otherwise have been included.
With these parameters, and eliminating the double counting that arises because of companion
cases, the data set includes 24 decisions, two of which are Singh and Andrews. I have included one
decision which at first blush appears at the margin of my parameters. This is Ontario v Fraser45 which I
have included because an important issue of non‐citizens’ rights was raised before the Court, although
this is not reflected in the decision. During the time frame of this study, the Supreme Court of Canada
made 2755 decisions.46 It is difficult to get an accurate count of how many of these would be
considered Charter decisions, although 490 is a reasonable estimate.47 In any case, the number of
Charter cases would not be an appropriate comparator because my data set includes a number of cases
where the decision does not engage with Charter rights in any way. This is helpful in understanding why
I describe the case set as ‘rights claims by non‐citizens during the Charter era’.
It is impossible to say precisely whether 24 cases is a ‘high’ or ‘low’ number of decisions. Non‐
citizens now face two important structural barriers in reaching the Supreme Court of Canada, in addition
43

The Immigration Act of 1976 was repealed by the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act which came into
effect on 28 June 2002. See Immigration Act, 1976, S.C. 1976‐77, c. 52 and Immigration and Refugee Protection
Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (hereinafter “IRPA”).
44
Here an important qualifier is that I have left this determination to the Court. While an individual non‐citizen
may have felt that their lack of Canadian citizenship was in some way relevant to the proceedings, if the Court did
not comment on citizenship, or stated that it was irrelevant, the case was not included.
45
Ontario (Attorney‐General) v Fraser, 2011 SCC 20, [2011] 2 SCR 3.
46
This number was obtained from the Supreme Court Reporter, beginning when the Charter came into force and
concluding at the end of 2011.
47
This number is the result of combining two sources, the count provided in Morton, F.L.; Russell, Peter H.;
Withey, Michael J. “The Supreme Court's First One Hundred Charter of Rights Decisions: A Statistical Analysis” 30
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to the usual barriers of time, money and a requirement to seek leave. The first of these is that
beginning in 1992, it became necessary to seek leave from the Federal Court Trial Division [as it then
was] in order to have most decisions under the Immigration Act judicially reviewed.48 The second is
that appealing a judicial review from the Federal Court to the Federal Court of Appeal requires that the
judge at first instance ‘certify’ that the case raises a serious question of general importance.49 Some
perspective on the 24 cases comes from looking at other jurisdictions. Between 1982 and 2011, the
High Court of Australia decided 103 cases involving refugee law matters alone.50 My data set includes
only four cases involving refugee law matters. The numbers are high in Australia in part because the
High Court has an original jurisdiction for judicial review,51 but by contrast Australia’s population is
smaller by 30 per cent and Australia has received approximately one‐fifth of the refugee claimants
Canada has received over this time frame. It could be argued that the Australian government was more
aggressive towards refugees during this time, but in light of the other factors, this is at best a partial
explanation. An alternative comparator is the Supreme Court of the United States which decided 21
refugee cases in the same time frame.52
There are three groups of cases which it is important to clarify that I have not included. The first
of these are cases which have adjudicated the boundaries of Canadian citizenship. These cases have, in
one way or another, focused on who should be considered a Canadian citizen. The focus is not on the
rights that non‐citizens have, but rather on the boundaries of the category. As these cases do not speak
to how non‐citizens in Canada access rights , they are excluded.53 The second group is cases which
address the reach of the Charter beyond Canadian borders. These cases are principally about the
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conduct of Canadian officials.54 While they do sometimes involve questions of how the Charter applies
to non‐citizens, they are not about how people in Canada can make rights claims. These cases are
about things that happen outside of Canada, and on that basis they have been excluded. Extradition
cases are not included in the dataset as citizenship is not a central focus of the proceedings, but they are
canvassed later in the paper because of the interesting counterpoint they raise.

Mapping the Jurisprudence
Apart from Singh and Andrews, the Supreme Court of Canada assessed a non‐citizens’ rights claim on
twenty‐two occasions in the first 30 years of the Charter. Logically enough, the cases raise diverse issues
and can be grouped together in any number of ways. Fifteen of the decisions deal with individuals
facing removal from Canada. Five deal with people seeking admission, and two have nothing to do with
the border setting. Of the fifteen removal cases, four are cases involving refugees or refugee claimants,
and the central issue involves interpretation of the Refugee Convention. These cases form a distinct
subset in that they are directly concerned with international law, and they deal with the Charter only in
passing. I discuss this distinct group separately. Of the remaining 18 cases, nine could squarely be
considered Charter cases.55 In six of the cases, there is at least some discussion of international human
rights law. Most cases discussing international human rights law are also Charter cases. The one
exception to this twinning is Baker v Canada,56 which was emphatically not a Charter case. In only one
case, Mugesera v Canada,57 the outcome relies directly on international law as a source of direct
obligation rather than as an interpretive tool for the Charter. In two other cases, Lavoie v Canada58 and
Baker, international law could fairly be said to influence the outcome, although this level of gradation is
difficult to be precise about. It is possibly notable that in both Mugesera and Lavoie the non‐citizen
loses at the Supreme Court of Canada level.
54
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With such a small group of cases, the numbers are not particularly meaningful, and serve more
to introduce the area than anything else. It is important to notice that non‐citizens’ cases are most likely
to reach the Supreme Court when there is a removal issue at stake. This core issue of a right to remain,
on the one hand, pitted against the state’s right to expel on the other, is at the heart of all immigration
law. The right to remain is also central to international refugee law because the Refugee Convention’s
protection against ‘non‐refoulement’ is the oldest and most widely applied constraint at international
law on a sovereign state’s power to expel non‐citizens.59 Interestingly, separating the removal cases into
matters raised by permanent residents and those raised by foreign nationals without permanent status,
did not prove to be analytically helpful, as will become clear below. To address the substance of both
Charter analysis and international human rights engagement I will discuss three groups of cases. I will
first present the ten non‐refugee cases where Charter or international rights feature in the decision.
Following this, I examine the eight non‐refugee cases where the Court’s response was not cast in rights
terms. I will then turn to the group of four refugee law cases. These three groups comprise the dataset
for the study.60 Following this presentation, I consider briefly three sets that are outside my selection
parameters: cases that were refused leave by the Supreme Court, extradition cases and cases directly
linked to non‐citizens. These latter two groups merit a brief canvass to fill in the picture of non‐citizens
rights claims in the Charter era.
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Rights Questions and Rights Answers
Following the ruling in Andrews, the next question of a non‐citizen’s rights claim to reach the Supreme
Court was Canada v Chiarelli in 1992. 61 The central issue was the deportability of a permanent resident
who had been convicted of serious crimes in Canada, and who was suspected of involvement in
organized crime. The Court’s unanimous ruling, and its approach, set in place key principles for non‐
citizens’ claims that have predominated since. The two most important of these were to draw attention
to the distinction between citizens and others in section 6 of the Charter, and to establish that the
relevant context for interpreting section 7 principles of fundamental justices is an ‘immigration context’.
Given that the right of a state to deport non‐citizens is unchallengeable except in cases of
refugee status or a risk of torture, the Chiarelli argument focused on the procedural aspects of reaching
a deportation decision. The facts in the case were ideal for raising the distinction between permanent
residents and citizens that has been key to the human rights and globalization thesis. Guiseppe Chiarelli
had come to Canada as a teenager. As an Italian citizen, he was facing deportation to a prosperous
Western country with a well‐developed legal system and a standard of living broadly similar to Canada’s.
Furthermore, given his age on emigration, the Court could assume that life in Italy would be familiar to
him. Having pled guilty to a drug trafficking charge as well as a charge of uttering threats to cause
injury, he was subject to clear societal condemnation. In short, there was nothing on the facts to cloud a
straightforward consideration of the procedural steps required for his removal. An appeal against this
order was then possible both on law and fact, as well as on compassionate grounds. The appeal could
be suspended if a security review committee, which had the option of holding closed hearings and of
keeping evidence secret, decided there were reasonable grounds to believe the person in question
would engage in organized criminal activity.
Although the Federal Court of Appeal had split on its assessment of the constitutionality of the
scheme, the Supreme Court had little difficulty in deciding that all aspects of the scheme were
constitutional. Indeed the Court did not need to address the question of whether there was any
deprivation of life, liberty or security of the person because it decided that in all respects, there was no
breach of principles of fundamental justice. Drawing on earlier decisions that the principles of
fundamental justice were to be determined by context, the Court considered the immigration context
for the first time here. The core of that context was summarized this way: ‘The most fundamental
principle of immigration law is that non‐citizens do not have an unqualified right to enter or remain in
61
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the country.’62 This reasoning was supported by looking to extradition jurisprudence, the need to keep
Canada from becoming a haven for criminals,63 and to the Charter’s distinction between citizens and
non‐citizens. With these framing principles in place, it is a short step to finding that ‘…deportation is not
imposed as a punishment’.64 While deportation may come within the scope of ‘treatment’ in section 12
of the Charter, it is not ‘cruel and unusual’. Indeed, the Court turns its test for the cruel and unusual
standard on its head, stating that:
The deportation of a permanent resident who has deliberately violated an essential condition of
his or her being permitted to remain in Canada by committing a criminal offence punishable by
imprisonment of five years or more, cannot be said to outrage the standards of decency. On the
contrary it would tend to outrage such standards if individuals granted conditional entry into
Canada were permitted, without consequence, to violate those conditions deliberately.65
Chiarelli was, therefore, an important starting point for separating citizens from non‐citizens in
Charter reasoning. The immigration context language is important as the dataset shows that almost all
Supreme Court cases where citizenship is relevant are linked in some way to immigration. This step
more than any other may be the key to understanding how the Court moved away from the promise of
Singh and Andrews: those cases are atypical in that they do not fall squarely in the immigration context
as developed by the Court.
The Chiarelli decision is also notable for what it did not say. Importantly, a potential equality
rights argument was passed over very quickly, in part because counsel had not made any submissions
on the issue.66 Given this, the Court limited its remarks to agreeing with the Federal Court of Appeal
that there was not a section 15 violation, and that the Charter specifically provides for ‘differential
treatment of citizens and permanent residents in this regard.’67 This characterization could be argued to
stretch the Charter language somewhat as it does not explicitly address deportation , but rather accords
to ‘citizens’ the ‘right to enter, remain in and leave Canada.’68 Under the contemporary Canadian
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approach to equality rights, the requirement of a ‘comparator group’ analysis is challenging for any
claim involving immigration legislation as it is difficult to formulate a comparator group of citizens. In
other jurisdictions, however, the fact that legislation applies solely to non‐citizens has been an essential
basis of a finding of discrimination.69 Chiarelli also makes no reference to international human rights
standards, which possibly could have been adduced to bolster arguments on either side of the central
issue.70
The Chiarelli approach flowed directly into the next decision to reach the Court, Dehghani v
Canada.71 Here the issue was whether a person who was required to undergo a ‘secondary’ immigration
examination upon entering Canada and claiming refugee status was ‘detained’ so as to trigger the right
to counsel provisions of section 10(b) of the Charter. The cases followed on two high profile decisions
regarding detention and the right to counsel.72 Mr. Dehghani had been required to wait ‘approximately
four hours’ for his secondary interview.73 The interviewer made extensive notes which were later
entered as evidence at what was then called a credible basis hearing. A key issue at that hearing was
that Dehghani had not disclosed at the airport the facts this refugee claim would be based on, but had
instead said that he was making a refugee claim because he wanted to work in Canada and to provide
(a) to move to and take up residence in any province; and
(b) to pursue the gaining of a livelihood in any province.
Limitation
(3) The rights specified in subsection (2) are subject to
(a) any laws or practices of general application in force in a province other than those that
discriminate among persons primarily on the basis of province of present or previous residence;
and
(b) any laws providing for reasonable residency requirements as a qualification for the receipt of
publicly provided social services.
Affirmative action programs
(4) Subsections (2) and (3) do not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object the
amelioration in a province of conditions of individuals in that province who are socially or economically
disadvantaged if the rate of employment in that province is below the rate of employment in Canada.
69
In the Belmarsh decision (cited as A (FC) and others (FC) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004]
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70
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for his children’s futures. Justice Iacobucci, writing for the Court in Dehghani, anchored his analysis with
the Chiarelli principle that there is no right for non‐citizens to enter Canada and that the most
fundamental principle of immigration law is that non‐citizens do not have an unqualified right to enter
or remain in the country. From this starting point, it was a short journey to the conclusion that neither
section 10(b), nor the more capacious section 7, were breached in this case.74
As in Chiarelli, no international human rights law appears in the decision. Here, however, this
absence is more remarkable as there is directly applicable international law on point. The Court’s
reasoning in Dehghani merges ‘refugee law’, and its international rights based framework, directly into
the immigration context that began developing in Chiarelli. Unlike immigrants however, refugee
claimants do have a right to enter at international law.75 In Canada, refugee law and immigration law are
linked together in one statutory framework. Refugee law comes directly from international human
rights law, and immigration law does not. The Court viewed Dehghani as a case about routine
procedure at airports, rather than a case about refugee claimants.76 Beginning from the refugee law
frame, however, leads in a completely different direction, as the dissenting voice in the Court below
demonstrated. Heald J.A. stated, ‘In the case of a refugee claimant such as this claimant, assuming that
even a portion of his factual assertions are true, the consequences of his enforced return to Iran could
well include incarceration, torture and even death.’77 Dehghani was an important step in drawing
procedural aspects of refugee claims into the evolving ‘immigration context’, and away from
international law. This manoeuver also served to starkly limit the jurisprudential influence of the Singh
decision, which had taken a very different approach to procedural matters involving refugees.78
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The next case where the Court engaged directly with a rights claim by a non‐citizen was the
fabled Baker v Canada decision handed down in 1999.79 Baker is the anomaly in this first group of cases,
as the decision does not rely directly on either the Charter or on international human rights its
conclusions. It does, however, fit the parameters of this first case group because of its forthright
engagement with arguments on both of these grounds, and because of the relationship it establishes
between Canadian domestic law and international human rights law. The tension between the majority
and minority views about this relationship may be partially responsible for the ensuing pattern of
engagement with international human rights.
Mavis Baker was poor and mentally ill and had been living in Canada for many years without
immigration status when she was ordered deported in 1992. She made an application on humanitarian
and compassionate grounds to remain in Canada and to be exempted from various provisions of the
Immigration Act. The immigration officer who reviewed her file wrote a negative recommendation
about it to his supervisor in terms that can at best be called prejudicial and unprofessional. The
Supreme Court’s response became the leading statement on the parameters of the duty of procedural
fairness. Ms Baker had eight children, four of who had been born in Canada, and these children became
central to the international human rights arguments made in the case. Because Canada had ratified the
Convention on the Right of the Child in 1991 counsel for Baker, as well as a number of interveners,
argued that the rights of Baker’s children ought to be taken into account in deciding how to respond to
her application for exceptional treatment on humanitarian grounds.80 Despite the ratification, the
Convention on the Rights of the Child had never been implemented into Canada law, and thus could not
have any direct application to the case under the Canadian dualist approach to international law.81
Justice L’Heureux‐Dubé, writing for the majority, fashioned a response that provided a role for
the ratified international human rights provisions. She ruled that Canada’s ratification of the
Convention was a relevant consideration in the statutory determination exercise undertaken to
determine the meaning of ‘humanitarianism and compassion’ in the Immigration Act. Specifically, she
wrote:
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Another indicator of the importance of considering the interests of children when making a
compassionate and humanitarian decision is the ratification by Canada of the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, and the recognition of the importance of children’s rights and the best
interests of children in other international instruments ratified by Canada. [….] Its provisions
therefore have no direct application within Canadian law. … Nevertheless, the values reflected
in international human rights law may help inform the contextual approach to statutory
interpretation and judicial review. […] The values and principles of the Convention recognize
the importance of being attentive to the rights and best interests of children when decisions are
made that relate to and affect their future. In addition, the preamble, recalling the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, recognizes that “childhood is entitled to special care and
assistance”. A similar emphasis on the importance of placing considerable value on the
protection of children and their needs and interests is also contained in other international
instruments. The United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child (1959), in its preamble,
states that the child “needs special safeguards and care”. The principles of the Convention and
other international instruments place special importance on protections for children and
childhood, and on particular consideration of their interests, needs, and rights. They help show
the values that are central in determining whether this decision was a reasonable exercise of the
H & C power.82

This creative response was a key aspect of the Court’s favourable ruling on Ms Baker’s behalf, and it
provided an avenue for looking at international human rights law, even when it had not been
implemented.83 What it did not do, however, was create a rights platform either within the Charter or
within international law. Justice L’Heureux‐Dubé opted not to respond to the Charter arguments put
before the Court, stating that as ‘…the issues raised can be resolved under the principles of
administrative law and statutory interpretation, I find it unnecessary to consider the various Charter
issues raised…’84 While in other instances, such as Singh, core administrative law principles have found
constitutional backbone in section 7’s ‘principles of fundamental justice’, in this case constitutional
rights arguments were raised but not answered. Ironically, in Baker, avoiding the constitution made it
easier to engage directly with international law in a statutory interpretation context. However, because
this engagement was necessarily indirect, it also meant that Baker was decided wholly on the murky
terrain of administrative law and statutory interpretation, and did not lead to a hard rights‐based
statement on behalf of non‐citizens. Empirically, the Baker decision has been shown to have had little
influence in the actual outcomes of humanitarian and compassionate applications.85
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Coming a decade after Andrews, Baker is another high‐water mark for non‐citizens before the
Supreme Court of Canada. And it was an undoubted win for Mavis Baker. But the substantive content
of the decision meant that it was not a Charter victory for non‐citizens. Indeed, Baker implicitly rejected
what was, by 1999, an established paradigm of turning to international human rights statements to
interpret Charter rights. This opportunity, in this context, was lost. The statutory interpretation
argument, which had such immense potential as penned in 1999, has not provided much traction,
proving just as Justice L’Heurexu‐Dubé asserted that this approach was hardly revolutionary in the
Canadian paradigm of statutory interpretation. Justice Iacobucci, in his minority reasons, averred to the
lost opportunity, but it is impossible to do any more than imagine what he would have done with it.86
If Baker can still be read as a peak of sorts in the trajectory of the non‐citizen jurisprudence,
Suresh, which came next chronologically in the first group, is definitely a trough.87 Manickavasagam
Suresh came to Canada from Sri Lanka in 1990 and was granted refugee status in 1991. As most
refugees do, he applied for permanent residency. While this application was being processed, the
Canadian government discovered information indicating that Suresh was associated with, or at least
acted as a fundraiser for, the Liberation Tiger of Tamil Eelam (the LTTE). The government sought to
deport him to Sri Lanka on security grounds. Suresh argued against this deportation on the basis he
would likely be tortured or killed by Sri Lankan authorities if he were returned. Before the Supreme
Court of Canada the facts were not disputed: the Tigers were a terrorist organization, and the human
rights record of the Sri Lankan government included widespread use of torture, especially against Tigers
and Tiger sympathizers. 88
The central question in Suresh was whether the Canadian government could deport a refugee to
face a risk of torture. The answer, albeit qualified, was yes. Because the Suresh Court spent little time
on interpreting the Refugee Convention, I have included this case in this group rather than in the group
of cases that are primarily about interpreting international refugee law for Canada.89 Suresh is primarily
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about the Convention Against Torture and how it is to be applied in Canada.90 Suresh’s own refugee
status was near to irrelevant at the Supreme Court level, given the focus on the non‐refoulement
provision of the Torture Convention.91
The focus of the reasoning in Suresh was whether his deportation would be a breach of the
section 7 guarantee of no deprivation of life, liberty and security of the person save according to
principles of fundamental justice. After finding that while torture would not be carried out by the
Canadian government, the government would still bear responsibility, the analysis focused on the
content of the principles of fundamental justice. The Court articulated both a Canadian perspective and
an international perspective on the question of whether such deportation would breach fundamental
principles. This draws a distinction between the two and also ensures a useful focus on the relationship
between international law and the Charter. Here, as in Baker, the Court was dealing with a ratified
convention which has not been directly implemented into Canadian law. The Court describes the
relationship between the Charter and the international principles as follows:
Insofar as Canada is unable to deport a person to torture where there are substantial grounds to
believe he or she would be tortured on return, this is not because Art. 3 of the CAT directly
constrains the actions of the Canadian government, but because the fundamental justice
balance under s.7 of the Charter generally precludes deportation to torture when applied on a
case‐by‐case basis. We may predict that it will rarely be struck in favour of expulsion where
there is a serious risk of torture. However, as the matter is one of balance, precise prediction is
elusive.92
While stopping short of pronouncing on whether a prohibition against deportation to face torture has
become a preremptory or jus cogens norm within international law, the Court does conclude, ‘…that
international law rejects deportation to torture, even where national security interests are at stake. This
is the norm which best informs the content of the principles of fundamental justice under section 7 of
the Charter.’93
In Suresh the Court follows its established method of using international human rights norms to
discern the content of Charter rights, but it concludes that the two are not the same. While
90
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international law clearly, possibly even to the point of a jus cogens norm, rejects deportation to torture,
the Charter will permit it under particular, if rare, circumstances. Accordingly, Suresh is a clear
statement that protection against deportation to face torture is lesser in Canada than it is at
international law. Non‐citizens in Canada will be protected against deportation to a prima facie risk of
torture when, on balance, the Minister of Immigration exercises her or his discretion accordingly; ‘In
Canada, the balance struck by the Minister must conform to the principles of natural justice under
section 7 of the Charter. It follows that insofar as the Immigration Act leaves open the possibility of
deportation to torture, the Minister should generally decline to deport refugees where on the evidence
there is substantial risk of torture.’94 Following Suresh, ministerial discretion to deport is framed by the
constitution, which itself looks to, but does not necessarily follow, international law.
Overall, this is a bad result for non‐citizens in Canada. It is not the worst possible result, and Mr.
Suresh himself ‘won’ at the Supreme Court level because he had not been accorded sufficient
procedural protections.95 But the principle it establishes – of possible deportation to torture – is
damaging. And the method of establishing it – prising apart Charter rights and international rights and
introducing to immigration law the device of ‘constitutionalized’ ministerial discretion – holds the
promise of worse to come. It is notable that in the companion case, an Iranian citizen who raised the
same argument was found to be deportable because he had been accorded adequate procedural rights,
and because the finding that he did not face a prima facie risk of torture was reasonable.96 It is legally
irrelevant but impossible to ignore that Suresh was argued in May 2001 and the decision was handed
down in January 2002. The Court deliberated through the horror of the 9/11 attacks and their
aftermath. This was the worst possible time for an individual suspected of raising funds for terrorists to
be before any court. It is interesting that despite its origins in the immigration legislation, the section 7
interpretation here did not make reference to an ‘immigration context’. Indeed, while the ‘context’
here was unnamed, the decision shares much with the ‘security context’ the emerged in subsequent
immigration cases to come to the Court.
The next case to arise chronologically, however, was Lavoie v Canada,97 one of only two in the
dataset dealing squarely with a rights claim by a non‐citizen that has nothing to do with the border.
Lavoie was handed down eight weeks following Suresh, and settled a challenge to the provisions of the
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Public Sector Employment Act which establish a preference for Canadian citizens in some types of public
service employment competitions. The Court upheld this limitation, with four judges finding an equality
rights infringement saved by ‘reasonable limitation’ analysis of section 1,98 and two additional judges
finding no equality rights infringement.99
The plurality judges differed sharply on the effect of the provision. Justice Bastarache, with
whom the larger group agreed, reasoned that, ‘…the claimants in this case felt legitimately burdened by
the idea that, having made their home in Canada…, their professional development was stifled on the
basis of their citizenship status. Their subjective reaction to the citizenship preference no doubt differed
from their reaction to not being able to vote, sit in the Senate, serve on a jury, or remain in Canada
unconditionally.’100 Arguing from the idea the proposition that ‘…work and employment are
fundamental aspects of this society…’ he concluded that, ‘[D]iscriminination in these areas has the
potential to marginalize immigrants from the fabric of Canadian life and exacerbate their existing
disadvantage in the Canadian labour market.’ 101 In assessing whether this limitation is justifiable, Justice
Bastarache called attention both to the prevalence of similar provisions, and to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which protects the access of citizens to public service
employment.102 He also noted that the existing provision is a preference, not a bar, which applies only
to open competitions. In contrast to this approach, Justices Arbour and LeBel, in separate opinions,
would have found that there was no equality infringement. As Justice LeBel summarized, ‘The
citizenship preference does not affect the essential dignity of non‐citizens. It is but a stage in an open
process of integration in a fully shared citizenship.’103
The dispute between the plurality judges was over the terrain of citizenship and equality.
Justice Bastarache’s judgment elevates the importance of work to human dignity and social participation
over the other citizenship privileges of formal political participation. This analysis is a strong
endorsement of a robust social citizenship reminiscent of the classic T.H. Marshall conception.104 The
reasoning is potentially further reaching than that in Andrews, but has been lost because of the ultimate
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finding in the case. It is also instructive to see how the facts here are distinguished from the Andrews
reasoning. It is clear that public service employment is a different, and more socially valuable, than
working as a lawyer. It is precisely on this point that the dissentients disagree with all of the plurality
judges, finding instead that this case is ‘…indistinguishable on the question of discrimination…’ from
Andrews.105 In terms of access to international human rights norms, in this case the international
instrument is not used in directly interpreting the content of Charter rights, but instead is marshaled –
somewhat indirectly ‐ as evidence against the non‐citizen claim in the section 1 analysis.
Lavoie joins Andrews as one of only two cases that are centrally focused on the rights claims of
permanent resident non‐citizens, and are distinct from the border crossing context of immigration law.
The other case which considers a ‘non‐border’ situation, Ontario v Fraser, does not address non‐
citizenship directly, but, rather, is relevant only because of the ‘missed opportunity’ to do so.
The next non‐citizen claim to reach the Supreme Court was Mugesera.106 The central issues
before the court were the appropriate standard of review for Immigration and Refugee Board findings of
fact and the standards to be met in issuing a deportation order, and thus were almost entirely in the
province of administrative law. 107 As was the case in Baker, the Court did not use the Charter in framing
its analysis. Indeed, the only reference to the Charter in the decision appears in the discussion of the
Federal Court of Appeal decision below.108 What is notable for, however, is that the Court responded to
Mugesera’s arguments with a detailed engagement with international law.
Leon Mugesera is a Rwandan citizen who, along with his family, obtained permanent residency
in Canada in 1993. Two years later, the Canadian government became aware that he had delivered a
speech at the outset of the Rwandan genocide which arguably incited murder, hatred and genocide, and
was therefore a crime against humanity. The Supreme Court ultimately upheld the Immigration and
Refugee Board’s finding that Mugesera is inadmissible because reasonable grounds exist to believe that
he had committed a crime against humanity prior to entering Canada. 109
The Court in Mugesera issued a unanimous judgment attributed to all eight members of the
panel jointly and the ruling was the Court’s first opportunity to comment on section 318(1) of the
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Criminal Code which implements the Genocide Convention, 110 as well it was a rare opportunity to
interpret the 2000 Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act.111 As befits this context, the reasoning
is meticulous, including a brief summary of Rwanda’s history and a full reproduction of a translated
version of Mugesera’s speech. The Court echoes Baker’s reasoning, despite the distinction that here the
international standards in question have been explicitly implemented:
The importance of interpreting domestic law in a manner that accords with the
principles of customary international law and with Canada’s treaty obligations was
emphasized in Baker v. Canada [citation omitted]. In this context, international sources
like recent jurisprudence of international criminal courts are highly relevant to the
analysis.112
The result is the most thorough and nuanced engagement with international law in any Supreme Court
case involving the claim of a non‐citizen. There is some irony in this fact, given that the international
standards are here used against the claims of the non‐citizen, but the Court’s approach is wholly
admirable in its detailed use of a range of domestic, foreign and international sources. Mugesera is also
distinguishable from many cases in this data set in that the Charter argument that had been influential
below was based on section 2(b) free speech protections, and thus this was not a case of turning to
international law to interpret the Charter itself. These features make the Mugesera decision stand out
despite its commonality with the majority of the cases in the set: at its core it is an argument by a non‐
citizen for a right to remain in Canada.
A few months later, the Court ruled in Medovarski.113 The reach of this decision is limited
because it was interpreting a transitional provision of the 2002 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act
and thus its specific holding could only apply to other non‐citizens whose circumstances overlap the
timeframes of two pieces of legislation. What the Medovarski decision does do, however, is reiterate
and extend the Court’s approach to section 7 of the Charter. Two individuals stand behind the
Medovarski ruling. Both were non‐citizens who had been convicted of crimes in Canada and sentenced
to more than two years in jail. As such, under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act they were
not entitled to a merits appeal to the Immigration and Refugee Board of their deportation orders.114
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Both appellants argued that Charter rights were engaged because deportation threatens liberty and
security of the persons. This argument was dismissed with a brief reference to Chiarelli’s ruling that
deportation “…in itself cannot implicate the liberty and security interests protected by s. 7 of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.”115 The Court further held that even if liberty and security
interests were engaged, and even if the transition between the two statutes operated unfairly, “…any
unfairness…does not reach the level of a Charter violation.”116 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice
McLachlin also found that the new legislation indicates an “…intent to prioritize security” and that “This
marks a change from the focus in the predecessor statute, which emphasized the successful integration
of applicants more than security.”117 This is, therefore, the first ruling which explicitly names “security”
as an immigration objective. As such it foreshadows directly the ruling in Charkoui v Canada,118 which
came seventeen months later.
The Supreme Court of Canada’s ruling in Charkaoui is the most important case to follow Singh
and Andrews because of the range of rights it dealt with, and because of those rights are at the core of
democratic governance and the rule of law. While both Singh and Andrews set unique and vital
precedents for non‐citizens before the courts in Canada, Charkaoui strongly delineated the limits of both
equality and liberty, as well as the limits of the rule of law as applied to non‐citizens.119 At issue in
Charkaoui were the provisions of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act that allowed for the long
term detention without trial of some non‐citizens awaiting deportation on the basis of evidence that the
state is entitled to keep secret.120 Adil Charkaoui had been detained in 2003, and at the time of the
hearing had been recently released on very strict conditions.121 Hassan Almrei and Mohamed Harkat,
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whose appeals were joined with Charkaoui’s, had been jailed even longer.122 All three men were
suspected of terrorist links and activities.123 Reflecting the importance of the issues at stake, the Court
heard the case over three full hearing days, a rare departure from its half day per matter norm and
comparable to the four day hearing for the Quebec Secession Reference in 1998.124 Furthermore,
eighteen parties were granted intervener status, which is similarly exceptional.
Charkaoui raised two inter‐related issues. The first was to what extent the state is entitled to
rely on evidence that it is not willing to make available to the individual concerned because of concerns
about national security and to security arrangements shared with other countries. The second is what
to do with individuals who cannot be deported because they face a risk of torture, or death, or other
forms of severe harm, if returned to their country of nationality (and, of course, no other country will
take them). The second issue picks up directly from the Suresh ruling and examines the consequences
of a decision that a person is not deportable. If that person is considered to be dangerous, states have
limited options. The provisions challenged in Charkaoui provided for long‐term – arguably indefinite –
detention in Canada without trial for the rare individual who would fall within these provisions and
therefore be subject to what Canadian immigration law calls a ‘security certificate’.125 These two issues
are not faced by Canada alone, and in the final section of the paper I will consider the varying responses
in other common law jurisdictions. It is worth pointing out that there was never (at least publically) any
serious discussion of prosecuting any of these three men, leaving open the distinct possibility that the
government had evaluated the evidence and concluded that it would not withstand the level of scrutiny
required by a criminal trial.
The most remarkable observation about Charkaoui in assessing access for non‐citizens in
Canada to international human rights protections, is that the unanimous ruling penned by the Chief
Justice does not make reference to a single international human rights instrument that is applicable in
Canada.126 This is particularly important in light of the fact that the core liberty rights at issue here are
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reflected in the most well‐established and long‐standing international instruments and, as such, have
also been interpreted and commented upon by a range of courts and international bodies. 127 This
interpretive stance indicates that by 2007, the Court viewed the content of Charter rights as being fully
‘domesticated’, capable of being interpreted and adapted on the basis of Canadian insights alone. There
are some references to jurisprudence elsewhere, for example in discussing the U.K.’s special advocate
procedure as a potential model for Canada128, in referencing U.S. and U.K. decisions concerning
indefinite detention of non‐nationals,129 and in commenting on the European Court of Human Right’s
landmark ruling regarding cruel and unusual punishment in the case of ‘death row phenomenon’ in the
United States.130 These references make up only 10 paragraphs of 143 in the judgment overall, and none
of them engages with the contents of particular rights. The U.S. and U.K. cases on indefinite detention
are those that would be potentially applicable in Charkaoui but the Court both distinguishes them,131
and asserts that its ruling is consistent with them.132 The ruling does not consider the Refugee
Convention, despite both Harkat and Almrei having refugee status.
The Charkaoui argument comprised an array of Charter challenges to all aspects of the security
certificate procedure.133 The Court found for the appellants on two points: first, that allowing no access
to the central evidence was a breach of fundamental principles of justice (section 7) that was not
justifiable because it was neither minimally impairing nor the least intrusive option; and second, that
allowing no review of detention for 120 days for foreign nationals was a breach of arbitrary detention
protections (ss. 9 and 10(c)) and that it should be brought in line with the 48 hour review provision
applicable to permanent residents. Overall, the ruling is disappointing for non‐citizens. Most
importantly, the Court found that because regular reviews of detention are provided for in the
legislation and guidelines have been developed by the courts, the detention is not unconstitutional
despite the fact that it can continue for an indeterminate amount of time. Reaching this conclusion
without reference to international law is doubly surprising.

127

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 2, Article 9, which also stipulates the right to
know the case against oneself. See also UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10
December 1948, 217 A (III), Article 9.
128
Charkaoui v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2007], supra note 555 at paras 80‐84.
129
Ibid. at paras 124‐127.
130
Ibid. at para 98, the case in question is Soering v United Kingdom (1989), 11 E.H.R.R. 439.
131
Ibid. at para 127: ‘The IRPA, unlike the U.K. legislation under consideration in Re A, does not authorize indefinite
detention and, interpreted as suggested above, provides an effective review process that meets the requirements
of Canadian law.’
132
Ibid. at para 124: These conclusions are consistent with English and American authority.
133
Twelve ‘constitutional questions’ are answered by the Court, see Ibid. at para 143.

29

The Charkaoui ruling made several important statements that may flow into other rulings
related to non‐citizens. While the issues are firmly in the province of immigration law, the Court here
described the context for section 7 rights analysis as a ‘security’ context rather than an immigration
context.134 This ‘context’ is a marked departure from that described in Chiarelli. Whether all
immigration issues have become security issues remains to be seen, but this possibility was certainly
signaled in Medovarski. In quickly dismissing the equality rights arguments about differential treatment
of non‐citizen terror suspects, the Court stated that ‘…s.6 of the Charter specifically allows for
differential treatment of citizens and non‐citizens in deportation matters…’.135 This is a broad stretch
from the wording of section 6, which says nothing about deportation and is primarily directed to entry
rights for citizens and mobility rights between provinces for citizens and permanent residents.136 Such
an extension of the content of what might previously have been argued to be a statement of a
straightforward positive right does not auger well for future distinctions between citizens and non‐
citizens, and cuts directly against the inclusive interpretive spirit of Singh. Indeed, the distinction
between citizen and non‐citizen terror suspects had been found impermissible in the U.K. once
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deportation was seen a remote possibility.137 In Charkaoui the Court instead found that despite the
lengthy detention and no evidence of impending deportation, the provisions remained meaningfully
tied to deportation and therefore permissible.138 In addition, while the Court found that foreign
nationals ought to benefit from the same detention review provisions as permanent residents, the heft
of the decision – right from the joining of the cases of two foreign nationals with one permanent
resident – puts permanent residents firmly on the side of ‘outsiders’ and thus cuts against what might
have been read into Andrews.139
The most positive statement for non‐citizens in Charkaoui may prove to be the clarification that
despite Medovarski and even Chiarelli, the conditions surrounding deportation may engage section 7
rights:
Medovarski thus does not stand for the proposition that proceedings related to deportation in
the immigration context are immune from s. 7 scrutiny. While the deportation of a non‐citizen
in the immigration context may not in itself engage s. 7 of the Charter, some features associated
with deportation, such as detention in the course of the certificate process or the prospect of
deportation to torture, may do so.140
Following Charkaoui, the government altered the legislation to introduce a special advocate
procedure, and to bring both the review schedule and the burden of proof for foreign nationals in line
with that for permanent residents. What remains in Canadian law is a procedure whereby non‐citizens
can be detained for an indeterminate amount of time on the basis of evidence that they can never
see.141 While it is too soon to see what the full reach of Charkaoui will be, the next opportunity is
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looming with the introduction of a new detention scheme which proposes to sharply reduce detention
review rights for some refugee claimants.142
A follow‐up matter, also styled Charkaoui v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)143 was argued
two years after the first hearing. This time, the narrow issues before the Court were the questions of
appropriate remedy for destruction and late disclosure of information by the Canadian Security
Intelligence Service. The Court held that liberty and security interests protected by the Charter were
engaged because of the seriousness of the security certificate procedure.144 This conclusion follows
logically from the first Charkaoui ruling. The Court distinguished the duty of disclosure required in this
setting from that in a criminal trial, and used the Charter as a guide to develop the duty.145 In regard to
the policy of destroying original notes, the Court stated ‘…the destruction by CSIS officers of their
operational notes compromises the very function of judicial review.’146 Despite this, however, there was
no additional remedy for Mr. Charkaoui beyond the postponement that he had already been granted.
The Court rejected the application for a stay that would have brought the security certificate
proceedings to an end, on the basis that what was at issue was an interlocutory rather than final ruling,
and that a stay would only be appropriate in ‘the clearest of cases.’ Instead, the Court ruled that the
designated judge assessing the certificate would need to take the Charter breach into account in
ultimately ruling on the reasonableness of the certificate.147
The final case in this section is Ontario v Fraser.148 This was a challenge to the 2002 Ontario
Agricultural Employees Protection Act, which established a separate labour relations regime for farm
workers in Ontario who are excluded from the Labour Relations Act. The new legislation was challenged
on the basis that it infringed association rights by restricting bargaining, and on equality grounds for
treating agricultural workers differently from other workers. The case raised an important non‐citizens
rights claim because of the high number of non‐citizens in the agricultural sector in Ontario, and
because of the role of Canada’s Seasonal Agricultural Worker’s Program.149 The non‐governmental
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organization Justicia for Migrant Workers was granted intervener status in the case. In their joint
factum with the Industrial Accident Victims Group of Ontario, Justicia for Migrant Workers summarized
their argument by saying, ‘…that the interests of migrant agricultural workers, other temporary foreign
workers and undocumented workers should be further considered and contextualized in the
interpretation of these Charter rights.’150 Their argument directly addressed the vulnerabilities of non‐
citizen workers, and the high levels of risk involved in agricultural work. This ruling is a clear statement
of a rights breach, but without a clear statement on remedy, it impact is considerably weakened.
Fraser differs from the other cases in the data set because its rights claim was not exclusively
one brought by non‐citizens. Despite this, however, the case must be counted here for two reasons.
First, the effect of the impugned provisions on non‐citizens was put directly before the Court, and
second, it will be difficult for non‐citizen agricultural workers to bring a separate challenge to the Court
given this ruling. The role of foreign workers in the agricultural sector is well known, and the facts and
arguments on this ground would not have been a surprise to the Court. Despite this, however, all four
sets of reasons are silent with regard to non‐citizen farm workers. The non‐citizenship status of many
agricultural workers appears only in the Justice Abella’s dissenting reasons in a citation from David
Beatty’s work.151 The majority judges overturned the Ontario Court of Appeal and upheld the
legislation. The ruling draws explicitly on international rights statements in some detail, including two
International Labour Organization Conventions, the ICCPR and the ICESR. In short, there is a greater
engagement with international human rights in this case than in the more recent cases which explicitly
concern non‐citizens. Justice Deschamps, in her separate opinion concurring in the result, did voice the
concern of many advocates that it has become very difficult to have ‘new’ grounds of discrimination
recognized under section 15.152 As non‐citizenship was recognized as a protected ground as long ago as
Andrews, it is perhaps in hindsight unfortunate for migrant agricultural workers that the challenge arose
in this setting, where the interests of citizens and non‐citizens were combined as the interests of
‘agricultural workers’.
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Fraser is the final case where non‐citizens rights claims were presented to the Court and where
the Court responded in rights terms, drawing on the Charter, or international standards, or both. Over a
thirty year period, the majority of cases that fit within this framework involved a question of
deportation. In a deportation setting, rights language is often ineffectual for individuals as the right of a
sovereign state to control its borders typically emerges as the ultimate ‘trump’ right.153 This trend is
apparent in this set. Equally, the argument of a number of scholars that permanent residents have
rights protections equivalent to those of citizens was less apparent over time in this dataset. Permanent
residency was a ‘failing’ argument in Lavoie and Medovarski, and it was irrelevant as a distinction in
Charkaoui. Ironically, only in Fraser were citizens and non‐citizens treated similarly, to the likely
detriment of a discrete non‐citizens’ claim. In sum, then, the Supreme Court of Canada rights
jurisprudence shows either that the trend towards human rights overwhelming citizen rights has ended,
or that it was never observable in Canada, Singh and Andrews notwithstanding. This group of cases also
demonstrates that the jurisprudence has sharply departed from the promise of Singh and Andrews.
None of the subsequent non‐citizens cases feature a successful equality analysis, in part because of the
difficulty of framing a ‘comparator group’ affected by the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. In
the case of section 7 rights, the broad reach of Singh to extend these rights ‘to everyone’ and the
importance of procedural rights for meaningful refugee protection have vanished into what is now a
‘security context’.
These cases, as a group, are the measure of non‐citizens’ rights claims before the Supreme Court
of Canada in the Charter‐era. They demonstrate both the extent of rights protections developed
explicitly for non‐citizens, and the capacity of non‐citizens to benefit from the protection of
international human rights norms. They do not, however, provide the full picture of how non‐citizens
have fared before the Court of Canada during this time frame Charter era. To complete the picture, I
next address the remaining case groups, before turning to consider what might explain these outcomes,
which, in important ways, put international human rights protections out of reach for non‐citizens in
Canada.

Cases without Rights: Making Sense of Rights Claims in the Province of Administrative Law
The second group of cases is those where a rights claim of some sort was presented to the Court and the
Court responded without relying on either the Charter or international human rights law. All of these
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cases began with a claim related to Canada’s immigration legislation, and thus the terrain covered here
is that of administrative law, with its rich array of procedural rights. It is, of course, the case that some
procedural claims, such as that in Singh, have been considered as ‘fundamental principles of justice’
under section 7. This case set, therefore, serves to illustrate the types of claims which have not become
Charter claims, nor have triggered an engagement with international human rights. There is a Charter
story to be told by noting which potential Charter arguments fail to have any resonance at all.
There is, of course, much shared terrain between this group and the first one. Seven of the nine
cases above were challenges to immigration provisions. One of those cases, Baker, has become a
cornerstone of Canadian administrative law and is very much part of the landscape of administrative
rights protections. Beyond Baker, a number of the non‐citizens’ right claims which that the Court did
respond to in human rights terms also include significant administrative law implications. My explicit
focus on investigating whether international human rights norms serve as an alternative to Charter
rights does tend to exaggerate the distinction between these two groups, making a hard line appear
where a blurred and porous border is more appropriate.
The dominant theme in this group is the ambit of discretion for bureaucratic immigration
decision makers at various levels. Chronologically, the first case involving the discretion of immigration
officers was the Jiminez‐Perez ruling, where the Court affirmed the duty to consider applications made
on humanitarian and compassionate grounds, and that such consideration could be compelled by the
courts.154 This brief decision predates all of those in the first set, including Singh. The second decision
was Prassad, where the Court ruled that an adjudicator conducting an inquiry leading to a deportation
order was not required to adjourn and wait for the conclusion of other applications under the
Immigration Act.155 The majority held that whether to adjourn was a matter completely in the hands of
the adjudicator.156 In the 1995 Chen ruling the Court endorsed the dissentient below in a one paragraph
ruling.157 At issue was the range of permissible considerations for a visa officer when assessing whether
the ‘points system’ score adequately reflects an economic migrant’s likelihood of successful
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establishment in Canada. The result confined the relevant factors to those connected to making a living
in Canada.158 In the final decision concerning bureaucratic decision makers, Hilewitz v Canada, the Court
ruled in 2005 that it was permissible to consider the personal wealth of an economic class permanent
residency applicant when assessing a question of health inadmissibility on the grounds of anticipated
high demand on social services.159 Interveners in this case had argued that the statute must be
interpreted in light of both the Charter and international human rights, but neither majority nor
dissenting judgments approached the case in this way.160
A second cluster of cases concerns the roles of immigration tribunals. The first of these,
Kwiatkowsky, was argued within weeks of the Charter coming into effect in 1982.161 Neither party made
Charter arguments, and the appellant’s factum was filed before the Charter was in force. The issue was
the standard of proof on a preliminary assessment of a refugee redetermination proceeding and the
analysis was a brief and tightly structured statutory interpretation.162 Interestingly, Justice Wilson drew
on this decision in building her Charter argument in Singh.163 The next case involving immigration
tribunal roles came twenty years later in the 2002 Chieu ruling. Here the Court examined the scope of
the discretionary jurisdiction of the Immigration Appeal Division (IAD) of the Immigration and Refugee
Board.164 Under both the former and current legislation, the IAD has power to allow a permanent
resident who is faced with removal from Canada to remain in the country even though the removal
order is correct in both fact and law. This capacity to take other factors into account has become known
as the IAD’s ‘equitable’ jurisdiction, in recognition of its fundamental non‐legal basis.165 The specific
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issue was whether the IAD could consider hardships an individual would face in the place to which they
would be returned, or whether there was a requirement to limit consideration to ‘domestic’ hardships.
The Court upheld the broader view of this provision.166 In 2009, this jurisdiction was again considered
by the Court. The key differences were that the legislative description of the power had been
changed167 and that the crucial Dunsmuir ruling concerning standards of review had been handed down
in 2008.168 In Khosa, the Court ruled that IAD decision makers were entitled to a high degree of
deference, so need not be ‘correct’ when exercising their equitable jurisdiction.169 The plurality
judgment authored by Justice Binnie chided the Federal Court of Appeal for retrying the case: ‘[C]learly,
the majority felt that the IAD disposition was unjust to Khosa. However, Parliament saw fit to confide
that particular decision to the IAD, not to the judges.’170 Substantively and procedurally, these two
rulings cement the breadth of the IAD’s discretion under both legislative formulations.
The final decision in this group is not about the breadth of discretion, but shares a theme with
Khosa as the central issue was who gets to decide. The 1994 ruling in Reza originated with a refugee
claimant who was rejected at an early stage in the process on the basis that his claim had no ‘credible
basis’.171 Mr. Reza was ordered deported, and he sought leave for judicial review (under the former
procedure) by the Federal Court of Appeal. When the Federal Court of Appeal denied his leave
application, Reza turned to the Ontario courts, arguing that deportation would breach his Charter rights.
He also sought unique Charter remedies. The Court ruled that the Ontario courts could not rehear what
the Federal Court of Appeal had denied leave to hear. The ruling notes the Charter arguments raised,
but does not address them.
This group of cases illustrates that the range of crucial decisions for non‐citizens in Canada
extends beyond the frameworks of the Charter and international human rights. This observation leads
to a number of conclusions. Paramount among these is that discretionary decision making, which
occurs outside a legal framework, is enormously important for non‐citizens. Several of these cases point
directly to key aspects of immigration discretion. For example, the ‘humanitarian and compassionate’
and compassionate considerations’ and ‘best interests of any child directly affected by the decision’ as well as ‘all
the circumstances of the case’.
166
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requests at issue in Jiminez‐Perez account for approximately 10,000 admissions annually over the past
five years.172 There is no legal standard for these admissions, and the criteria are highly malleable.173
Similarly, the so‐called equitable jurisdiction of the IAD is outside of legal parameters. While there is
more shape to this jurisdiction in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act than under the earlier
jurisdiction, a decision maker still has recourse to ‘all the circumstances’ of the case. The only decision
in this set where the Court ruled to restrict discretionary decision making in any was Chen, where the
Court confined itself to endorsing the dissentient below. While in some circumstances such as Suresh
and Baker the scope of discretion has been shaped by Charter or international rights, this did not occur
in any of these cases.
While all bureaucratic decision makers have some measure of discretion, a number of studies
have confirmed that the ambit of discretion is broader in immigration law, and have traced this
executive power to the strong role for the executive in admission to the state generally.174 This
discretionary space is in turn linked to potential weaknesses of rights claims: once discretionary space is
asserted a rights claim cannot gain any traction. It becomes irrelevant. This is the shift described by
Justice Iacobucci in writing for a unanimous Court in Chieu:
In my view, this appeal can be decided by applying principles of administrative law and statutory
interpretation, as was the case in this Court’s decision in Baker v. Canada [citation omitted]. It is
not necessary to address directly the scope and content of ss. 7 and 12 of the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms.
It is therefore true that this set of cases establishes that Charter and human rights concerns will not be
relevant for this range of concerns. Charter principles have, however, extended their reach into some
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areas of administrative law and thus these responses from the Court could not have been a foregone
conclusion.175
Finally, while these cases show areas where explicit rights arguments will not take root, it is
important not to overlook the powerful remedy provided by procedural rights. A number of these cases
were important ‘wins’ for non‐citizens.

They also serve to confirm the access of non‐citizens to the

courts and to rule of law principles, both of which are enshrined in important international human rights
documents.176

Refugee Law: An International Human Rights Claim
The third group of cases is those where the Court’s principal ruling involved an interpretation of the
Refugee Convention.177 There are four decisions in the group (with one additional companion ruling).
This group is distinct for two reasons. The first is because the central provision of the Refugee
Convention, the definition of a refugee, has been incorporated directly into Canadian legislation.178 This
means that access to the international norm is not mediated by Charter interpretation. The second
distinction is the uneasy relationship of the Refugee Convention to international human rights law.179
Refugee law has grown closer to the core of international human rights law over the past two decades,
but there is still a gap between the two paradigms.180 For these reasons, the way the Court approaches
refugee law cannot be taken as a proxy for the Court’s approach to international human rights.
It is also important to point out that these cases are not the only cases in the data set to concern
refugees. The group is based on an engagement with the Refugee Convention. A number of key cases
discussed above did, of course, concern refugees, refugee claimants, or permanent residents who were
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originally refugees.181 In one of the cases in the first group, Suresh, the Court did engage with the
Refugee Convention in some detail. This engagement, however, was not determinative and the
centerpiece of the rights analysis there was the Convention Against Torture. Justice Wilson’s opinion in
Singh did make use of the Refugee Convention, but was not a ruling on its interpretation. Singh
demonstrated how the Refugee Convention could influence the interpretation of Charter rights, a
jurisprudential feat that has not been repeated.
The first refugee case was Canada v Ward handed down in 1993.182 Ward remains the most
important Canadian ruling on interpretation of the refugee definition, and over the intervening two
decades it has been applied almost daily in first instance refugee decision making at the Immigration
and Refugee Board. Ward has also influenced refugee decision makers throughout the common law
world.183
The Ward Court explicitly embraced an international law approach to interpreting the definition
contained in the then Immigration Act. Justice LaForest considered the Convention’s travaux
préparatiores, the views of publicists, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees handbook
and decisions from both within and outside Canada.184 Most importantly, Justice LaForest began his
reasoning with a clear commitment to international law, stating that … ‘[a]t the outset, it is useful to
explore the rationale underlying the international refugee protection regime…’185 He concluded with a
clear statement about the object and purpose of the Refugee Convention, stating that, ‘[u]nderlying the
Convention is the international community’s commitment to the assurance of basic human rights
without discrimination’.186 Justice LaForest did not refer to international instruments beyond the
Refugee Convention, but his interpretive approach followed established treaty interpretation rules.
Charter arguments were only briefly addressed in the Ward reasons, in response to the intervening
Canadian Council for Refugees argument that section 15 equality jurisprudence ought to determine the
interpretation of ‘particular social groups’ in the refugee definition. Justice LaForest found it
unnecessary to engage with this argument given that he had rejected the narrow approach of the Court
below for other reasons. Despite this explicit ruling, he did turn to Charter reasoning to guide his anti‐
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discrimination approach, drawn from international law, and applied to the ‘particular social group’
standard.187
The Ward decision set a clear direction for the Supreme Court’s engagement with the Refugee
Convention. Undoubtedly influenced by the refugee definition’s direct incorporation into Canadian
domestic law, the Court looked to international sources and methods in interpreting the definition. This
approach did not include looking at human rights instruments beyond the Refugee Convention, but this
international trend in refugee law interpretation was not nearly so well established in 1993 as it is now.
The Charter atmosphere of the early 1990s provided a close parallel to Justice LaForest’s view of the
Convention’s purpose as an assurance of ‘basic human rights without discrimination’, and the idea of an
‘influential atmosphere’ probably best describes how he turns to Charter jurisprudence, without directly
engaging the Charter. This is not a case of access to international standards mediated by the Charter.
This decision established a pattern in Canadian refugee law for a direct access to international
interpretations. This approach has shown considerable endurance, in part because the Supreme Court
has taken so few opportunities to engage with the Refugee Convention.188
The next Refugee Convention case to reach the Court illustrates this point. With only four
rulings that hinged on interpreting the Convention over the thirty year period, Chan v Canada is most
notable for what it did not do.189 The appellant in this case was a Chinese national, allegedly fleeing
persecution in the form of forced sterilization as a consequence of breaching the PRC’s notorious one‐
child policy. The majority judges decided on the basis of what they identified as an evidentiary
shortcoming at the first instance.190 In sum, Justice Major wrote that, ‘[t]he appellant failed to adduce
any evidence to establish on a balance of probabilities that his alleged fear of forced sterilization was
objectively well‐founded.’191 The majority reasons focus entirely on the evidentiary question. Justice
Major did make use of the UNHCR handbook in his reasons, but he did not interpret key aspects of the
refugee definition that were potentially at issue. Indeed, Refugee Convention is silent on evidentiary
matters. On the key questions of whether forced sterilization fits within the interpretation of
‘persecution’ and whether the appellant was a member of a ‘particular social group’, Justice Major
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assumed without deciding that a related case in the Federal Court of Appeal was correct on these
points.192 This approach meant that the Supreme Court of Canada never ruled on these questions,
which were key issues for refugee decision makers around the world.193
Justice La Forest penned a strongly worded dissent in which he emphasized that ‘…the
consideration of basic human rights [is] the appropriate focus of a refugee inquiry.’194 He followed the
interpretive approach he had elaborated in Ward and explored definitions of both persecution and
particular social group.195
Three years later the Court ruled in Pushpanathan v Canada, a case interpreting the provisions
of the Refugee Convention which exclude people from refugee protection based on categories of bad
behaviour.196 Mr. Pushpanathan was facing deportation because of a drug trafficking conviction and the
Court was asked to determine whether drug trafficking was ‘contrary to the purposes and principles of
the United Nations’ so as to exclude him from refugee protection. Writing for the majority, Justice
Bastarche began his substantive discussion of the Refugee Convention with a review of the principles of
treaty interpretation.197 This approach is, therefore, even more explicit on this point than was Ward but
Justice Bastarche also carefully illustrated that his approach is consonant with Ward on this point.198
Justice Bastarche discussed the antecedents of the Convention, the travaux préparatiores, and a range
of other international treaties, in considerable detail. He concluded that the Court below erred because
it did not take the correct approach to treaty interpretation.199 His analysis followed the Vienna
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Convention’s interpretation rules and focused closely on the object and purpose of both the Refugee
Convention and the explicit exclusion provision at issue.200 This analysis led to a focus on the human
rights purpose of the Refugee Convention as stipulated in Ward, and to the conclusion that drug
trafficking, while the subject of serious international condemnation, is not central the purposes of the
United Nations. Leaving open the possibility of a future shift in this positioning, he concluded by saying:
Until the international community makes clear its view that drug trafficking, in one form or
another, is a serious violation of fundamental human rights amounting to persecution, then
there can be no rationale for counting it among the grounds of exclusion.201
Justice Cory in dissent would have found that drug trafficking was a central purpose of the United
Nations, but did not disagree with Justice Bastarache regarding either the interpretive principles at issue
or the purposes of the Refugee Convention.202 Pushpanathan affirmed Ward’s approach to interpreting
aspects of the Refugee Convention implemented in Canada’s domestic immigration law as belonging
firmly to the international treaty interpretation framework. It also reaffirmed the Court’s view that the
Refugee Convention has a human rights purpose.
It would be twelve years before the Court returned to Refugee Convention as a central issue.203
Early in 2010, the Court ruled in Nemeth v Canada, addressing the possibility of extraditing refugees.204
The decision was handed down with a companion ruling, Gavrila v Canada. Both Nemeth and Gavrila
had obtained refugee protection in Canada because of their risk of being persecuted as ethnic Roma in
their respective home countries, Hungary and Romania. In each case, the country of nationality sought
extradition on the basis of low level fraud offences (sums of less than $5000 were involved in each case)
committed prior to departure from the home country, and included in Gavrila’s case a conviction in
absentia.205 The result in each case was a ‘win’ for the refugee as the extradition order was found to

200

The basic rules of treaty interpretation are codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N.T.S.
vol. 1155, p. 331, Article 31.
201
Pushpanathan, supra note 1966 at para 74.
202
Ibid. at paras 78‐158. See para 128 regarding the purpose of the Refugee Convention. Major J. concurred with
Cory J.
203
As mentioned, the Court did briefly interpret the Refugee Convention in Suresh in 2002. There the Court
concluded that refugee status was not a bar to returning some individuals to face a risk of torture. The decision
was primarily concerned with the Convention Against Torture and canvassed international law reasonably well in
that analysis, see discussion above at pages 21‐23.
204
Nemeth v Canada [2010] 3 SCR 281. Nemeth was handed down with the companion case Gavrila v Canada
[2010] 3 SCR 342.
205
Nemeth (along with his wife and co‐accused) had become a law abiding permanent resident in Canada. His
experience in Hungary included a series of violent crimes against him. Gavrila had not been able to become a
permanent resident in Canada because of a series of criminal convictions (all property crimes) in Canada.

43

have been improperly made. But the reasoning draws away from the Ward and Pushpanathan
approach, especially by drawing away from international law and from treaty interpretation principles.
While the Refugee Convention establishes a comprehensive reply to the question of when a
refugee can be extradited,206 in its decision the Court gave primacy to Canada’ Extradition Act over the
international framework.207 Having decided that Canada’s non‐refoulement obligation towards refugees
is met through the Extradition Act rather than by applying provisions of the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act,208 the Court proceeded to analyze the extradition question with only brief engagement
with the Refugee Convention. Justice Cromwell stated that the grounds of protection in the domestic
legislation implement those in the Refugee Convention, despite the fact that the two lists are not the
same.209 His analysis of the extradition provisions included references to the 1990 Model Treaty on
Extradition, and to international extradition practice, but only two paragraphs refer specifically to the
Refugee Convention and publicists interpreting it.210 The Court referenced Pushpanathan and its
embrace of the human rights purpose of the Refugee Convention, but did not follow Pushpanathan’s
methodology.211 Instead, interpretation of the Convention’s provisions was guided primarily by domestic
Canadian decision making. Most importantly, Justice Cromwell concluded that the question of whether
a person is, in his words, ‘entitled’ to refugee status is to be re‐asked at the point of considering an
extradition request. This procedure therefore upends the Refugee Convention’s approach, and puts the
Article 1F provisions ahead of the Article 33 provision explicitly directed at expulsion of those with
refugee status.212 In addition to being the Court’s most recent statement on how to approach the
Refugee Convention, Nemeth is also the only case in this group that was heard by the full nine‐member
Court.213
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These four cases mark a unique subset of the Supreme Court’s engagement with the
international human rights of non‐citizens during the Charter era. The refugee cases have been decided
with scant reference to the Charter. And cases involving refugees, but not the refugee definition, have
scarcely looked at the Refugee Convention since the Singh ruling, despite the Convention’s rich refugee
rights text that extends well beyond the core definition of a refugee. The early approach was to turn
directly to international law, and international treaty interpretation methods. The Court departed from
this direction in Nemeth, but it is too soon to tell whether this direction will be sustained outside the
extradition context. While Nemeth is a regrettable departure from international legal standards, it is too
soon to judge whether this indicates that the refugee law cases are following the pattern of the first
group, where a strong start at the outset of Charter determination has given way in more recent cases
to an insular, domestic focus in rights interpretation. As this paper was in its final preparation in the
spring of 2012, the Court granted leave in Ezokola v Canada.214 Thus the Court’s next opportunity to
interpret the Refugee Convention is on the near horizon.
This group of cases concludes the picture of the Court’s treatment of rights claims by non‐
citizens during the 30 year life of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Before stepping back and offering
some possible explanations of this worrisome jurisprudence, there are three more clusters of rulings to
mention briefly that complete the story of the Court’s approach to non‐citizens. These clusters concern
cases in which the Court refused leave; extradition (outside the refugee context); and two cases where
the claims brought by citizens were directly linked to those of non‐citizens: Canadian Council of
Churches215 and Mavi.216

Choosing Not to Decide
The Supreme Court does not give reasons for declining to grant leave, and leave is denied in close to 90
per cent of cases.217 Nor is it possible to make meaningful comparisons in grant rates in varying areas of
law.218 Finally, it is difficult to accurately count the number of applications for leave in that would
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correspond to my dataset in this paper, in part because of the methodological considerations discussed
above, and in part because of unevenness in how the information is made available.219 In short, it
important not to make too much of this group of cases.220 It helps complete the picture, however, to
look briefly at matters which the Court has deliberately chosen not to hear, as these cases are indicators
both of issues that are unlikely to come before the Court in the short term and of issues that received
considerable attention in the advocacy community.
Since the advent of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, the Supreme Court has denied
leave in two cases that were directly tied to the question of non‐citizen’s access to international human
rights norms. In De Guzman v Canada221 the argument involved interpretation of the Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act’s provision for interpretation “in a manner that complies with international
human rights instruments to which Canada is signatory”.222 Advocates had high aspirations for this
provision, which the Federal Court of Appeal interpreted as a codification of the Supreme Court’s Baker
approach and nothing more.223 In 2007, the Canadian Council for Refugees, the Canadian Council of
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Churches and Amnesty International brought a challenge to Canada’s “Safe Third Country” agreement
with the United States to the Federal Court.224 At the trial level, this challenge was successful and the
judgment involved a detailed engagement with both the Charter and international law. The Federal
Court of Appeal, however, circumvented the rights questions raised and instead overturned the ruling
primarily on the basis of what it called the absence of a “factual basis upon which to assess the alleged
Charter breaches”.225 A Supreme Court of Canada ruling on one or both of these cases would have
contributed significantly to the picture of non‐citizens’ access to international human rights protections
during the Charter era.
Other high profile cases that did not make it to the Supreme Court include Satiacum v Canada
where an American citizen and hereditary chief of the Puyallup Indians had been found at first instance
to be a refugee;226 Canada v Thamotharem a challenge to significant procedural changes in refugee
determinations;227 Hinzman v Canada where a member of the United States’ military sought and was
denied refugee status on the basis of his objections to the American role in Iraq;228 Villafranca v Canada
which set the standard for ‘state protection’ analysis in refugee determinations;229 Langner v Canada
affirming that deporting the parents of citizen children did not raise any Charter issues;230 and most
recently Toussaint v Canada, a challenge to fee provisions for humanitarian and compassionate
applications.231 This list is partial, and it is difficult to develop a complete list as the publicly available
databases only have a complete list of leaves denied from 1997 onwards.232
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Extradition – One Story Worth Telling
The Supreme Court of Canada’s extradition jurisprudence is not part of the dataset because citizenship
is not a central criterion in most extradition matters.233 Factually, of course, because extradition
involves alleged criminal activity in another country, the targets of extradition proceedings are
frequently non‐citizens. Since 1982, 35 extradition matters have come before the Supreme Court of
Canada. Two of these rulings, Nemeth and Gavrila discussed above, raised the question of when a
refugee can be extradited and thus involved analysis of the Refugee Convention and are discussed
above.234 Of the remaining 33 rulings, 15 concerned Canadian citizens, 4 concerned non‐citizens, and in
14 judgments the citizenship of the individual is not mentioned.235
The Supreme Court’s work on extradition has, however, produced one important story that
provides a fitting counterpoint in my narrative of non‐citizens, the Charter, and international human
rights norms. The most important extradition case in the Charter era to date is United States v Burns.236
Burns is important because of its forthright reversal of the Court’s ruling in Kindler v Canada a mere ten
years earlier.237 The ruling is a courageous and unified stance by the Court, directly confronting the
possibility of extraditing an individual to face capital punishment in the United States. The Court
233
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concluded that assurances that an extradited individual will not be put to death ‘…are constitutionally
required in all but exceptional cases.’238 The Court explicitly rejected the easy route of deviating from
the Kindler conclusion because Burns and his co‐accused, Rafay, were Canadian citizens and Messrs.
Kindler and Ng were not.239 In reaching its conclusion, the Court considered an array of sources,
including international law and foreign law from several jurisdictions and drew particular attention to
shifting international initiatives over the preceding decade.240 In this regard, the Burns decision in 2001
is a paradigmatic reflection of the thesis that international human rights have become more important
than citizen rights. This ruling is a strong reflection of the Supreme Court of Canada’s embrace of
international human rights law, and shows an extensive reliance on an international framework for
interpreting the Charter, and on shifts within that framework, almost twenty years into the Charter era
in 2001.241
From the point of view of my central argument here, however, the decision in Burns is deeply
ironic. It is impossible not to remark the embrace of international human rights in a case where
citizenship rights could have led to the same conclusion, and equally impossible not to remark that
citizenship was the key factual distinction in this high profile and direct reversal. The Kindler Court had
been marked by a strong dissent, with opposing judgments deploying competing rhetoric about
Canadian values and Canadian identity.242 The decision in Burns, while standing staunchly for identical
rights and treatment for citizens and non‐citizens, provides a hint to which I shall return in the
concluding analysis that this may not generally be the case before the Supreme Court of Canada.

Two Cases Directly Adjacent
There are two additional cases that require some brief comment. Neither of these directly involve a
non‐citizen’s rights claim before the Court, but both are closely linked to non‐citizens’ rights, and were
supported by the immigration and refugee advocacy community in Canada for that reason. The first of
these cases is Canadian Council of Churches v Canada, handed down in 1992.243 The Canadian Council of
Churches sought to challenge new legislative provisions introducing changes to Canada’s refugee
determination system on the first day that the legislation was in force, arguing that public interest
238
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standing was appropriate given the potential harms of the legislation and the time it would take for an
affected individual to bring a claim. The government challenged the Council’s standing to bring such and
claim, and the Supreme Court upheld that challenge. This ruling endured as the limit line for public
interest standing throughout most of the Charter era until late in 2012.244 It has proven a particularly
important line for those who are outside of the country, and thus it is arguably more important for non‐
citizens than for citizens.245 The second case was Canada v Mavi, handed down in 2011.246 This was a
challenge brought on behalf of a group of individuals who had sponsored family members to immigrate
to Canada and those family members had later received a variety of social assistance payments.247 The
payments resulted in ‘sponsorship debt’ obligations. The facts underlying the eight joined cases were
compelling, including sponsors who had not known that the payments had been received, sponsors who
had become destitute themselves, and sponsors who had actively tried to prevent the payments to their
relatives. The court ruled that the debt was partially contractual and partially statutory. As such, debt
collection attracted some measure of procedural fairness, but could not be waived.248 Each of these
cases tells part of the story of advocacy on behalf of non‐citizens before the Supreme Court of Canada.

This completes the review of the Supreme Court of Canada’s engagement with non‐citizens’
rights claims over the past thirty years. Overall, the arc of this jurisprudence is disappointing. Despite
the strong statements at the outset in Singh and Andrews, non‐citizens have had few victories at
Supreme Court of Canada, and crucially these victories have relied on very few strong statements of
Charter rights and even fewer assertions of international human rights. The protection of section 7’s
‘principles of fundamental justice’ has been limited by an ‘immigration’ and most recently ‘security’
context and the reach of the Refugee Convention has, post‐Singh been narrowed to the refugee
definition only. The inclusion of lack of citizenship as an analogous ground of equality protection has
not let to any successful arguments following Andrews. What remains, then, is to consider what factors
might explain this outcome.
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Trends, Explanations, Conclusions
Several possible explanations for this trajectory in the jurisprudence come to mind on quick reading.
One argument that has had some traction elsewhere is Legomsky’s seminal work demonstrating that the
highest courts of the United States and the United Kingdom have been extraordinarily deferential to
executive decision making in matters of immigration.249 In the same vein, Aleinikoff has argued in the
United States context that immigration is one of the areas that the Supreme Court has viewed as being a
particular repository of sovereignty.250 This is an analysis that I have developed and tested in the
Canadian and Australian contexts in earlier work.251 Another argument that has recently held sway is
that law and policy directed towards non‐citizens has been influenced by the security turn in global
politics following the terrorist attacks of 9/11.252 It is largely since the security turn that the argument
that human rights have overtaken citizenship rights has become less prevalent. The Supreme Court of
Canada jurisprudence reflects this argument in part, particularly in the shift from an immigration context
to a security context for section 7 analyses.
Both of these arguments do contribute part of the explanation for the the observable trends in
the Supreme Court of Canada’s jurisprudence. For example, the Court on several occasions issued a
response that ‘constitutionalized’ a space for discretionary decision‐making, rather than make a hard
rights‐based response (Suresh, Baker, Chieu, Charkaoui). This device fits squarely into the exceptional
deference pattern. It is certainly the case that the Suresh ruling as well as Charkaoui and Medovarski do
contain strong security discourses corresponding with a global swing towards regarding non‐citizens
through a securitized lens. But neither of these accounts offers a fully satisfying explanation for the
Canadian jurisprudence. In the first case, the deference argument was most clearly articulated
elsewhere in the mid‐1980s, as the Court was penning Singh and Andrews. These ruling that launched
the Charter era were not at all deferential. The security argument has been most persuasive elsewhere
in explaining executive rather than judicial actions, whereas if this argument is to have explanatory
power for the Supreme Court of Canada’s rulings, it would need to be adapted to a judicial setting. In
the United States and the United Kingdom, the contours of this argument point to tensions between the
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executive and the judiciary. Adding these familiar explanations together can give an account of a
number of the cases, but not for a majority of the dataset.
It is also the case that the jurisprudence shows some traces of the argument that the distinction
between citizenship and permanent residency is waning in importance. In Andrews and Burns this
pattern was discernible. But, as with the first two points, this is not a clear trend. Charkaoui and Lavoie
cut in precisely the opposite direction.
What is most striking in this jurisprudence, however, is the ways in which the Canadian Court is
out of step with leading decisions on very closely parallel decisions in other similar jurisdictions. In
addition, looking more closely at this dissonance, it appears to be attributable to a different approach
to international human rights standards. These two trends are closely interrelated and can be explained
at least in part by the Court’s jurisprudential stance towards international human rights norms in the
Charter era. It is the explanatory value of how the Court has used the Charter to translate international
human rights which emerges most clearly when looking at the whole body of this jurisprudence over the
thirty year period. Broadly speaking, the more recent decisions have less ‘space’ for international law,
and this seems to impoverish their reasoning in some ways. All of this requires more detailed attention,
to which I now turn to conclude this analysis.
First is the observation that on some key issues, the Supreme Court has been out of step with
other similar jurisdictions. Two vital examples are the questions of deportation to a risk of torture and
indefinite detention. The Suresh conclusion that Canada can in some limited circumstances deport
individuals to torture varies from the conclusion of the [then] House of Lords and the Supreme Court of
New Zealand.253 Both of these Courts held themselves bound by the international law. The Canadian
Court clearly agreed about the effect of the international law, but nonetheless left a space for Canadian
decision makers to depart from it. In the question of indefinite detention, the House of Lords ruled that
once deportation could no longer reasonably be viewed as ‘imminent’ detention was impermissible.254
The Supreme Court of the United States made an almost identical ruling on the question of indefinite
detention, albeit in a case where a risk of torture had not been established.255 The Supreme Court of
New Zealand went even further, hinging its condemnation of indefinite detention to the provisions of
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the Refugee Convention.256 Each of these rulings differs from Charkaoui where the Court held that a
review of detention once every six months ensures that detention will not be indefinite, but stops short
of limiting detention to a particular time or to the feasibility of deportation.
This is not to say that in every instance or on every issue, non‐citizens have encountered more
favourable outcomes in the United Kingdom and New Zealand. Such a conclusion would require a
detailed consideration of those courts paralleling the work of this study. Rather, my point is that in two
key high profile issues, the outcomes differed markedly.
It is also the case that in issues concerning non‐citizens, other courts have tended to draw more
directly on international law. This is certainly the case with the House of Lords and New Zealand
Supreme Court judgments discussed above. Similarly in a key ruling addressing treatment of non‐
citizens detained at Guantanamo Bay, the United States Supreme Court drew directly on international
law in support of rulings against the special military tribunals initially established.257 All of these rulings
depend directly on international human rights norms to assess the rights of non‐citizens. This turn
towards international human right is something that the Supreme Court of Canada has not done aside
from in interpreting the Refugee Convention. It is no coincidence that these decisions of the House of
Lords, the Supreme Court of New Zealand, and the United States Supreme Court have all been
recognized as significant rights victories for non‐citizens. They have also advanced the international law
jurisprudence to new circumstances.
Aside from the Refugee Convention cases, the Supreme Court of Canada has not made a single
ruling in the Charter era which directly applies an international human rights norm to a non‐citizen in
Canada. This would be important, but not legally relevant, if Canada were not a state party to key
international human rights documents.258 But it is. This would not be important if the Charter were
being used to reach the results that international norms would provide. But it is not. As I stated at the
outset, if rights are vindicated the precise legal tool used is far less important than the outcome. In
essence, this is reflected in the paradigm for Charter rights interpretation: international law will inform
Charter rights interpretation, and thus Charter protection will be at least equal, and possibly better than,
what is provided at international law. This approach was clearly elaborated in early Charter rulings,
beginning with Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act in 1987, where Chief Justice Dickson
wrote, “…The content of Canada's international human rights obligations is, in my view, an important
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indicia of the meaning of ‘the full benefit of the Charter's protection’. I believe that the Charter should
generally be presumed to provide protection at least as great as that afforded by similar provisions in
international human rights documents which Canada has ratified.”259 In the Slaight Communications
ruling two years later, Chief Justice Dickson reiterated this point and went further, saying, “…Canada's
international human rights obligations should inform not only the interpretation of the content of the rights
guaranteed by the Charter but also the interpretation of what can constitute pressing and substantial s. 1
objectives which may justify restrictions upon those rights.”260 The Court has not deviated from this
commitment over time, reiterating in 2010, in the specific context of section 7 rights, ‘ ….The principles
of fundamental justice “are to be found in the basic tenets of our legal system”:.. They are informed by
Canadian experience and jurisprudence, and take into account Canada’s obligations and values, as
expressed in the various sources of international human rights law by which Canada is bound.’261
But this review of the non‐citizens cases shows that, at least in this setting, this interpretative
paradigm is not delivering on its promise. It also demonstrates that non‐citizens’ attempts to make
arguments directly based on international human rights have not had any traction whatsoever.262 The
more recent cases tend to have shorter discussions of international human rights norms (Charkaoui,
Fraser) or to overtly depart from what international law would mandate (Suresh, Nemeth). Earlier
decisions did tend to refer somewhat more routinely to international norms (Singh, Baker).263 One
possible explanation of the current state of affairs is that in the early years of Charter interpretation, the
Court was working out the contents of Charter rights and therefore needed to draw more directly on
international standards. As the Charter matured, therefore, less engagement with international human
rights would be anticipated. As logical as this may seem, this theory of the linkage between Charter
rights and international rights would isolate non‐citizens in Canada from progressive developments in
international law. This is observable in even my brief canvass of high profile decisions in parallel
jurisdictions, but it cannot be doctrinally desirable. By contrast with the non‐citizen cases, in some of
the rulings adjacent to the dataset, we find examples of missed opportunities. In Burns there was a
robust engagement with international law to interpret and update the Charter. In Canadian Council for
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Refugees v Canada (the ‘Safe Third Country’ decision) the Federal Court had fully canvassed
international sources at first instance.
What is observable in this analysis of the non‐citizens’ rights claims in the Charter era is a kind of
Charter hubris: a jurisprudence that implicitly takes the position that the Charter delivers all the human
rights protections that any individual could need. This would be fine, even ideal, if it seemed to be
working. That is if the Charter rights did include, at a minimum, any new advance in the international
sphere, both the law and the range of venues that an individual would need to approach would be
simplified. (Indeed as difficult as it is to reach the Supreme Court of Canada, the hurdles pale in
comparison to those involved in getting an implementable outcome from an international body.)
Importantly, this may be precisely how Charter rights and international human rights fit together in
other areas – the majority – of the Court’s decision making.264 This study has not attempted to look
beyond the claims brought by non‐citizens, and therefore it is focusing on a tiny fraction of the Court’s
decision making. A key impetus for this inquiry was to assess and document the extent to which non‐
citizens in Canada have been able to make use of international human rights. At least at the Supreme
Court of Canada level, this study shows that the ability to make arguments drawing on international
rights is starkly limited. This conclusion is bolstered by some recent victories in international fora
holding that Canada has breached international human rights commitments to non‐citizens.265 It also
dovetails with my study of Immigration and Refugee Board decision making, which showed scant
attention to international human rights law in that tribunal.266
There is certainly more work to be done to fully theorize what this jurisprudence demonstrates
and to push forward the consequences of this analysis. But regardless of where the work drawing on
this data will lead, it is provocative and doctrinally important to set the cases end to end and to define
the terms of the Supreme Court of Canada’s engagement with rights claims made by non‐citizens.
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Rights protection for non‐citizens in Canada is more important now than at any other time in the
Charter era. The Canadian government has moved to tighten the boundaries of citizenship, inscribing
strong distinctions between citizens and permanent residents.267 Since the 2002 Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act, permanent residents have been more vulnerable to deportation, and new
legislation introduced in June 2012 will increase this vulnerability.268 Beginning in 2009, there has been
a marked increase in the number of temporary foreign workers admitted to Canada, individuals who will
not have the protections of permanent residency.269 In 2012 the decision‐making framework for
refugee protection in Canada has been fundamentally altered.270 All of these shifts mean that non‐
citizens in Canada are more vulnerable to rights abuses than at any point in the previous thirty years.
Non‐citizens need the robust protection of both the Charter and international human rights norms. It is
time to bring these two bodies of law back into harmony.
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The Canadian government amended the Citizenship Act R.S.C. 1985, c. C‐29, with Bill C‐37 of 2007 which made
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Bill C‐37 which would have brought into effect the ‘Strengthening the Value of Canadian Citizenship Act’. This bill
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Bill C‐43, Faster Removal of Foreign Criminals Act, Introduction and First Reading in the House of Commons
(2012‐06‐20).
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Preliminary figures on temporary foreign workers from 2007‐2011 are available at CIC, online:
<http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/statistics/facts2011‐preliminary/04.asp>.
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Bill C‐31, Protecting Canada's Immigration System Act, Committee Report Presented in the Senate (2012‐06‐
21).
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